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Abstract
Logics of limited belief aim at enabling computa-
tionally feasible reasoning in highly expressive rep-
resentation languages. These languages are often
dialects of first-order logic with a weaker form of
logical entailment that keeps reasoning decidable
or even tractable. While a number of such logics
have been proposed in the past, they tend to remain
for theoretical analysis only and their practical rel-
evance is very limited. In this paper, we aim to go
beyond the theory. Building on earlier work by Liu,
Lakemeyer, and Levesque, we develop a logic of
limited belief that is highly expressive while remain-
ing decidable in the first-order and tractable in the
propositional case and exhibits some characteristics
that make it attractive for an implementation. We
introduce a reasoning system that employs this logic
as representation language and present experimental
results that showcase the benefit of limited belief.
1 Introduction
Dealing with incomplete knowledge is one of the longstanding
aims of research in Knowledge Representation and Reasoning.
Incompleteness often demands highly expressive languages to
be represented accurately. For instance, the statement
“I don’t know who Sally’s father is, but I know he’s rich”
involves an individual (Sally’s father) and both knowns (he’s
rich) and unknowns (his identity) about him. From the rep-
resentational point of view, first-order and modal logics are
excellent tools to formalise such statements. However, reason-
ing in classical first-order logic very quickly gets undecidable:
an existential quantifier and two unary functions with equal-
ity can be enough to make validity an undecidable problem
[Bo¨rger et al., 1997].
One way to get around undecidability of first-order reason-
ing is through models of limited belief.1 Inspired by natural
agents, the idea behind limited belief is to give up the property
of logical omniscience [Hintikka, 1975]. This separates lim-
ited belief from other approaches to decidable reasoning like
∗This is an extended version of the IJCAI 2017 paper [Schwering,
2017] with proofs in the appendix.
1We use the terms knowledge and belief interchangeably.
the classical prefix-vocabulary classes [Bo¨rger et al., 1997] or
description logics [Baader, 2003], but relates to approaches
of approximate reasoning like [D’Agostino, 2015]. While a
number of models of limited belief have been proposed in the
past [Konolige, 1986; Vardi, 1986; Fagin and Halpern, 1987;
Levesque, 1984b; Patel-Schneider, 1990; Lakemeyer, 1994;
Delgrande, 1995], these approaches can be criticised for either
being too fine-grained or overly weakening the entailment re-
lation and thus even ruling out the most basic cases of modus
ponens.
A more recent proposal for limited belief is due to Liu, Lake-
meyer, and Levesque [2004]. Their logic is equipped with a
perspicuous semantics based on subsumption, unit propaga-
tion, and case splitting,2 and keeps the computational com-
plexity under control by stratifying beliefs in levels: level
0 comprises only the explicit beliefs; every following level
draws additional inferences by doing another case split. Every
query specifies at which belief level it shall be evaluated, and
thus controls how much effort should be spent on proving it.
The rationale behind this technique of limiting belief by case
splits is the hypothesis that in many practical reasoning tasks
few case splits – perhaps no more than one or two – suffice.
Let us consider a brief example to illustrate the idea. Sup-
pose we have the following knowledge base (KB):
(fatherOf(Sally) = Frank ∨ fatherOf(Sally) = Fred) ∧
∀x(fatherOf(Sally) 6= x ∨ Rich(x)).
At level 0 the agent believes these clauses, but does not
draw any meaningful inferences from them yet. For instance,
Rich(Frank)∨Rich(Fred), while entailed in classical logic, is
not believed at level 0. It can however be inferred by splitting
the cases for Sally’s potential fathers:
• if fatherOf(Sally) = Frank, then we obtain Rich(Frank)
by unit propagation with the second clause from the KB;
• if fatherOf(Sally) = Fred, then analogously Rich(Fred);
• if fatherOf(Sally) is anyone else, then unit propagation
with the first clause in the KB yields the empty clause.
2Unit propagation of a clause c with a literal ` means to remove
all literals from c that are complementary to `. Subsumption refers
to inferring a clause c2 from a clause c1 when every literal in c1
subsumes a literal in c2. A case split means to branch on all possible
values a literal or term can take.
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Either of the three cases subsumes Rich(Frank) ∨ Rich(Fred).
Hence, Rich(Frank) ∨ Rich(Fred) is believed at level 1.
Several variants of Liu, Lakemeyer, and Levesque’s original
theory have been developed [Lakemeyer and Levesque, 2013;
2014; 2016; Klassen et al., 2015; Schwering and Lakemeyer,
2016]; they include concepts like introspection, actions, func-
tions, or conditional beliefs. Despite this progress, the frame-
work has remained a purely theoretical one without practical
applications.
In this paper, we want to bring their approach to limited
belief to practice. We make two contributions to this end:
• Firstly, we devise a logic of limited belief that unifies
some concepts from the earlier proposals and adds sev-
eral features to make it more attractive for practical use.
The result is a sorted first-order logic with functions
and equality and two introspective belief operators, one
for knowledge and one for what is considered possible.
While closely related to the earlier proposals, many tech-
nical details in this new language have been changed with
practical considerations in mind.
• Secondly, we present a reasoning system that uses
this logic as representation language. Our evaluation is
twofold. Besides modelling toy domains to showcase the
language’s expressivity, we have also tested the system’s
performance with two popular puzzle games, Sudoku and
Minesweeper. The results affirm the hypothesis that small
belief levels often suffice to achieve good results.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we introduce
an (omniscient) logic of knowledge. Based on this logic, we
then develop a logic of limited belief in Section 3. In Section 4
we sketch a decision procedure for limited belief, discuss an
implementation of this system, and present experiment results.
2 A Logic of Knowledge
The logic we present in this section is a variant of Levesque’s
logic of only-knowing [Levesque, 1990] and will serve as a
reference for the logic of limited belief in the next section. We
refer to the logic from this section as L.
2.1 The Language
The language of L is a sorted first-order dialect with functions,
equality, standard names, and three epistemic modalities. With
minor modifications, this language will also be the language
used for the logic of limited belief LL.
We assume an infinite supply of sorts, and for each sort we
assume an infinite number of variables, function symbols of ev-
ery arity j ≥ 0, and standard names (or names for short). Stan-
dard names serve as special constants that satisfy the unique
name assumption and an infinitary version of domain closure.
The set of terms (of a sort s) contains all variables (of sort
s) and names (of sort s) as well as all functions f(t1, . . . , tj)
where f is a j-ary function symbol (of sort s) and every ti is
a variable or a name (not necessarily of sort s). A literal is
an expression of the form t1 = t2 or ¬t1 = t2 where t1 is a
variable, name, or function, and t2 is a variable or a name. The
set of formulas is the least set that contains all literals and all
expressions ¬α, (α ∨ β), ∃xα, Kα, Mα, and Oα where α
and β are formulas and x is a variable.
Intuitively,Kα reads as “α is known,”Mα as “α is consid-
ered possible,” andOα as “α is all that is known.” We say a
formula is objective when it mentions no belief operator, and
subjective when it mentions no function outside of a belief
operator. Only-knowing is particularly useful to capture the
meaning of a knowledge base. As we only consider objective
knowledge bases in this paper, we restrict ourselves from now
on to objective φ inOφ.
For convenience, we use the usual abbreviations 6=, ∧, ∀, ⊃,
and ≡, and we sometimes omit brackets to ease readability.
Some differences between our language and traditional first-
order languages are apparent: our language features no predi-
cates; functions cannot be nested; only the left-hand side of a
literal may be a function. These restrictions will prove help-
ful for the implementation of a reasoning system. We remark
that none of these restrictions means a limitation of expres-
sivity: a predicate P (t1, . . . , tj) can be simulated by a literal
p(t1, . . . , tj) => where > is some standard name chosen to
represent truth, and nested functions and literals with a func-
tion on the right-hand side can be flattened by introducing a
new variable – these transformations preserve equivalence.
As an example, we formalise the introductory statement
about Sally’s father, who is rich but unknown to the agent:
K∃x(fatherOf(Sally) = x ∧ rich(x) => ∧
M fatherOf(Sally) 6= x),
where Sally is a standard name of the same sort (say, ‘hu-
man’) as x and fatherOf, and > is a name of the same sort
(say, ‘Boolean’) as rich. Quantifying x into the modal context
M expresses that the father’s identity is unknown. The next
subsection gives a semantic justification to this interpretation.
2.2 The Semantics
The semantics is based on possible worlds. We call a term
f(t1, . . . , tj) primitive when all ti are standard names. Let N
and T be the sets of all names and primitive terms, respectively.
To denote the names or primitive terms that occur in a formula
α, we write N (α) and T (α), respectively, and analogously
for sets of formulas. To include only terms of the same sort
as t, we write Nt and Tt. A world w : T → N is a sort-
preserving mapping from primitive terms to standard names,
that is, w(t) ∈ Nt for every primitive term t. A sentence is a
formula without free variables. We denote by αxt the result of
substituting t for all free occurrences of the variable x in α.
Truth of a sentence α is defined w.r.t. a world w and a set
of possible worlds e as follows:
1. e, w |= t= n iff
• t and n are identical names if t is a name;
• w(t) and n are identical names otherwise;
2. e, w |= ¬α iff e, w 6|= α;
3. e, w |= (α ∨ β) iff e, w |= α or e, w |= β;
4. e, w |= ∃xα iff e, w |= αxn for some n ∈ Nx;
5. e, w |= Kα iff e, w′ |= α for all w′ ∈ e;
6. e, w |= Mα iff e, w′ |= α for some w′ ∈ e;
7. e, w |= Oφ iff e = {w′ | e, w′ |= φ}.
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Unlike classical first-order logic, this semantics handles
quantification by substitution of names. Standard names thus
effectively serve as a fixed, countably infinite universe of
discourse. See [Levesque, 1984a] for a discussion why this is
no effective limitation for our purposes.
Oφ has the effect ofKφ and additionally requires the set
of possible worlds e to be maximal. Hence the agent knows φ
but considers possible everything else provided it is consistent
with φ. In other words, everything that is not a consequence of
φ is unknown, for its negation is consistent with φ. That way,
Oφ captures that φ and only φ is known.
As usual, a sentence α entails another sentence β, written
α |= β, when e, w |= α implies e, w |= β for all e, w. A
sentence α is valid, written |= α, when e, w |= α for all e, w.
We omit a deeper analysis except to note thatK is a K45
operator [Fagin et al., 1995] and the following equivalences:
Proposition 1
(i) |= Kα ≡ ¬M¬α;
(ii) |= ∀xKα ≡ K∀xα and |= Kα ∧Kβ ≡ K(α ∧ β);
(iii) |= ∃xMα ≡M∃xα and |= Mα∨Mβ ≡M(α∨β);
(iv) |= Oφ ⊃ Kφ.
To familiarise ourselves with the logic, we show that the
query formalised at the end of Section 2.1 is entailed by
O
(
(fatherOf(Sally) = Frank ∨ fatherOf(Sally) = Fred) ∧
∀x(fatherOf(Sally) 6= x ∨ rich(x) =>))
where Frank and Fred are names of sort ‘human.’ Let φ denote
the sentence within O. By Rule 7, e = {w | e, w |= φ} is
the only set of worlds that satisfies Oφ, so proving the en-
tailment reduces to model checking for e. By assumption, for
every w ∈ e, w(fatherOf(Sally)) ∈ {Frank,Fred}. Suppose
w(fatherOf(Sally)) = Frank; the case for Fred is analogous.
By assumption, w(rich(Frank)) = >, so it only remains to be
shown that e, w |= M fatherOf(Sally) 6= Frank, which holds
because there are w′ ∈ e with w′(fatherOf(Sally)) = Fred.
3 A Logic of Limited Belief
We now introduce the logic LL, the limited counterpart of L.
3.1 The Language
The language of LL follows the rules from L with the follow-
ing modifications: the expressionsKα andMα are replaced
with Kkα and Mkα where k ≥ 0 is a natural number, and
the expression Gα is added to the language. We read Kkα
and Mkα as “α is believed at level k” and “α is considered
possible at level k,” respectively, and the new expressionGα
intuitively means “assuming the knowledge base is consistent,
α is true.” Guaranteeing consistency is motivated by practical
applications where it often may reduce the computational cost
of reasoning.
3.2 The Semantics
In LL, sets of clauses take over from sets of possible worlds
as the semantic primitive that models belief. Intuitively,
these clauses will represent the agent’s explicit knowledge,
like fatherOf(Sally) = Frank ∨ fatherOf(Sally) = Fred and
∀x(fatherOf(Sally) 6= x ∨ rich(x) = >) in our running ex-
ample. By means of case splitting and unit propagation then
further inferences can be drawn from these clauses. Before we
can formalise this, we need to introduce some terminology.
We call a literal ground when it contains no variables. Recall
that a primitive term is one of the form f(n1, . . . , nj) where
the ni are names. Therefore every ground literal is of form
n= n′ or n 6= n′ or f(n1, . . . , nj) = n or f(n1, . . . , nj) 6= n
for names ni, n, n′.
A literal is valid when it is of the form t= t, or n 6= n′ for
distinct names n, n′, or t 6= t′ for terms t, t′ of distinct sorts.
A literal `1 subsumes a literal `2 when `1, `2 are identical or
`1, `2 are of the form t = n1 and t 6= n2 for distinct names
n1, n2. Two literals `1, `2 are complementary when `1, `2 are
of the form t= t′ and t 6= t′ (or vice versa), or `1, `2 are of the
form t= n1 and t= n2 for distinct names n1, n2.
A clause is a finite set of literals. A clause with a single
literal is a unit clause. We abuse notation and identify non-
empty clauses {`1, . . . , `j} with formulas (`1 ∨ . . .∨ `j). The
above terminology for literals carries over to clauses as follows.
A clause is valid when it contains a valid literal, or a literal
t= t′ and its negation t 6= t′, or two literals t 6= n1 and t 6= n2
for distinct names n1, n2. A clause c1 subsumes a clause c2
if every literal `1 ∈ c1 subsumes a literal `2 ∈ c2. The unit
propagation of a clause c with a literal ` is the clause obtained
by removing from c all literals that are complementary to `.
A setup is a set of ground clauses. We write UP(s) to denote
the closure of s with all valid literals under unit propagation:
• if c ∈ s, then c ∈ UP(s);
• if ` is a valid literal, then ` ∈ UP(s);
• if c, ` ∈ UP(s) and c′ is the unit propagation of c with `,
then c′ ∈ UP(s).
We write UP+(s) to denote the result of adding to UP(s) all
valid clauses and all clauses that are subsumed by some clause
in UP(s). Similarly, UP−(s) shall denote the setup obtained
by removing from UP(s) all valid clauses and all clauses
subsumed by some other clause in UP+(s).
Truth of a sentence α in LL, written s0, s, v |≈ α, is defined
w.r.t. two setups s0, s and a set of unit clauses v. The purpose
of having these three parameters is to deal with nested beliefs.
For the objective part of the semantics, only s is relevant:
1. s0, s, v |≈ ` iff ` ∈ UP+(s) if ` is a literal;
2. s0, s, v |≈ (α ∨ β) iff
• (α ∨ β) ∈ UP+(s) if (α ∨ β) is a clause;
• s0, s, v |≈ α or s0, s, v |≈ β otherwise;
3. s0, s, v |≈ ¬(α∨β) iff s0, s, v |≈ ¬α and s0, s, v |≈ ¬β;
4. s0, s, v |≈ ∃xα iff s0, s, v |≈ αxn for some n ∈ Nx;
5. s0, s, v |≈ ¬∃xα iff s0, s, v |≈ ¬αxn for every n ∈ Nx;
6. s0, s, v |≈ ¬¬α iff s0, s, v |≈ α.
Note how negation is handled by rules for (t1 6= t2), ¬(α∨β),
¬∃xα, ¬¬α. A rule s0, s, v |≈ ¬α iff s0, s, v 6|≈ α would be
unsound, as LL is incomplete w.r.t. L (as we shall see).
We proceed with the semantics of Kkα. The idea is that
k case splits can be made first, before α is evaluated. A case
split means to select some term (say, fatherOf(Sally)) and
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branch (conjunctively) on the values it could take (namely all
standard names of the right sort, such as Frank and Fred). To
preserve soundness of introspection, the effect of case splits
must not spread into nested beliefs. This is why we need to
carefully manage three parameters s0, s, v. Intuitively, s0 is
the “original” setup without split literals, and v “stores” the
split literals. Once the number of case splits is exhausted, s0∪v
takes the place of s, so that the objective subformulas of α are
interpreted by s0 ∪ v, whereas the subjective subformulas of α
are interpreted by s0 (plus future splits from the nested belief
operators). We say a setup s is obviously inconsistent when
UP(s) contains the empty clause. In this special case, which
corresponds to the empty set of worlds in the possible-worlds
semantics, everything is known. The semantics of knowledge
formalises this idea as follows:
7. s0, s, v |≈ K0α iff
• s0 ∪ v is obviously inconsistent, or
• s0, s0 ∪ v, ∅ |≈ α;
8. s0, s, v |≈ Kk+1α iff
for some t ∈ T and every n ∈ Nt,
s0, s, v ∪ {t= n} |≈ Kkα;
9. s0, s, v |≈ ¬Kkα iff s0, s, v 6|≈ Kkα.
Similarly, the idea behindMkα is to fix the value of certain
terms in order to show that the setup is consistent with α.
Intuitively this means that we want to approximate a possible
world, that is, an assignment of terms to names, that satisfies
α. Often we want to fix not just a single term, but a series of
terms with a common pattern, for instance, f(n) = n for all n.
To this end, we say two literals `1, `2 are isomorphic when
there is a bijection ∗ : N → N that swaps standard names in
a sort-preserving way so that `1 and `∗2 are identical, and define
vunionmultis`1 =v∪{`2 |`1, `2 are isomorphic and ¬`2 /∈UP+(s∪v)}.
In English: v unionmultis `1 adds to v every literal that is isomorphic
to `1 and not obviously inconsistent with the setup s ∪ v.
Furthermore, we need to take care that after fixing these
values the setup is not potentially inconsistent. We say a setup
s is potentially inconsistent when it is obviously inconsistent
or when the set {` | ` ∈ c ∈ UP−(s)} of all literals in UP−(s)
contains two complementary literals, or a literal t = n for
n /∈ Nt, or all literals t 6= n for n ∈ Nt for some primitive
term t. Note that this consistency test is intentionally naive,
for the complexity ofMkα shall be bounded by k alone. The
semantics of the consistency operator is then:
10. s0, s, v |≈M0α iff
• s0 ∪ v is not potentially inconsistent, and
• s0, s0 ∪ v, ∅ |≈ α;
11. s0, s, v |≈Mk+1α iff
for some t ∈ T and n ∈ Nt,
s0, s, v ∪ {t= n} |≈Mkα or
s0, s, v unionmultis0 (t= n) |≈Mkα;
12. s0, s, v |≈ ¬Mkα iff s0, s, v 6|≈Mkα.
To capture that Oφ means that φ is all the agent knows,
we need to minimise the setup (modulo unit propagation and
subsumption), which corresponds to the maximisation of the
set of possible worlds in L. We hence define:
13. s0, s, v |≈ Oφ iff
• s0, s0, ∅ |≈ φ, and
• s0, sˆ0, ∅ 6|≈ φ for every sˆ0 with UP+(sˆ0) ( UP+(s0);
14. s0, s, v |≈ ¬Oφ iff s0, s, v 6|≈ Oφ.
Lastly, we define the semantics of theGα operator, which
represents a guarantee that s is consistent and therefore can
reduce the size of s to clauses potentially relevant to α. We de-
note the grounding of α by gnd(α) = {βx1...xjn1...nj | ni ∈ Nxi}
where β is the result of removing all quantifiers from α, and
x1, . . . , xj are the free variables in β. Finally, s|T is the least
set such that if c ∈ UP−(s) and c mentions a term from T ,
is empty, or shares a term with another clause in s|T , then
c ∈ s|T . ThenGα works as follows:
15. s0, s, v |≈ Gα iff s0|T (gnd(α)), s, v |≈ α;
16. s0, s, v |≈ ¬Gα iff s0, s, v |≈ G¬α.
This completes the semantics. We write s0, s |≈ α to abbre-
viate s0, s, ∅ |≈ α. Note that for subjective formulas σ, s is
irrelevant, so we may just write s0 |≈ σ. Analogous to |= in
L, we overload |≈ for entailment and validity.
In this paper we are mostly concerned with reasoning tasks
of the formOφ |≈ σ where σ is a subjective query and φ is a
knowledge base of a special form called proper+: φ is of the
form
∧
i ∀x1 . . . ∀xj ci for clauses ci.
Observe that a proper+ KB directly corresponds to the setup
gnd(φ) =
⋃
i gnd(ci). Also note that while existential quanti-
fiers are disallowed in proper+ KBs, they can be simulated as
usual by way of Skolemisation.
Reasoning in proper+ KBs is sound in LL w.r.t. L, provided
that the query does not mention belief modalitiesKk ,Mk in
a negated context. While the first-order case is incomplete, a
restricted completeness result for the propositional case will
be given below. We denote by σL the result of replacing in σ
everyKk ,Mk withK ,M . The soundness theorem follows:
Theorem 2 Let φ be proper+ and σ be subjective, without
O,G, and without negatedKk ,Mk .
ThenOφ |≈ σ impliesOφ |= σL.
Negated beliefs break soundness because of their incom-
pleteness. For example, Kk (t = n ∨ ¬¬t 6= n) in general
only holds for k ≥ 1. Hence ¬K0(t= n ∨ ¬¬t 6= n) comes
out true, which is unsound w.r.t. L. As a consequence of this
incompleteness,Mkα ≡ ¬Kk¬α is not a theorem in LL.
For propositional formulas, that is, formulas without quan-
tifiers, high-enough belief levels are complete:
Theorem 3 Let φ, σ be propositional, φ be proper+, σ be
subjective and without O,G. Let σk be like σ with every
Kl ,Ml replaced withKk ,Mk .
ThenOφ |= σL implies that there is a k such thatOφ |≈ σk.
To conclude this section, let us revisit our running example.
The KB is the same as in Section 2.2, and the modalities in
the query are now indexed with belief levels:
K1∃x
(
fatherOf(Sally) = x ∧ rich(x) => ∧
M1 fatherOf(Sally) 6= x
)
.
By Rule 13, s0 = {fatherOf(Sally) = Frank∨ fatherOf(Sally)
= Fred, fatherOf(Sally) 6= n ∨ rich(n) = > | n ∈ Nx} is
4
the unique (modulo UP+) setup that satisfies the KB. To
prove the query, by applying Rule 8 we can split the term
fatherOf(Sally). Consider s0 ∪ {fatherOf(Sally) = Frank}.
By unit propagation we obtain rich(Frank) =>, so we can
choose Frank for x in Rule 4, and all that remains to be
shown is that s0 |≈M1 fatherOf(Sally) 6= Frank. This is done
by assigning fatherOf(Sally) = Fred in Rule 11, and as the
resulting setup s0 ∪ {fatherOf(Sally) = Fred} is not poten-
tially inconsistent and subsumes fatherOf(Sally) 6= Frank, the
query holds. Returning to the splitting in Rule 8, the case
s0 ∪ {fatherOf(Sally) = Fred} is analogous, and for all other
n, the setups s0 ∪ {fatherOf(Sally) = n} are obviously incon-
sistent and therefore satisfy the query by Rule 7.
4 A Reasoning System
We now proceed to describe a decision procedure for reasoning
in proper+ knowledge bases, and then discuss an implementa-
tion as well as experimental results.
4.1 Decidability
Reasoning in proper+ knowledge bases is decidable in LL:
Theorem 4 Let φ be proper+, σ be subjective and withoutO.
ThenOφ |≈ σ is decidable.
We only sketch the idea here for space reasons; for the full
proof see the appendix. For the rest of this section, we use Lk
as a placeholder forKk andMk .
Let us first consider the case where σ is of the form Lkψ
for objective ψ; we will turn to nested modalities later. As φ is
proper+, gnd(φ) gives us the unique (modulo UP+) setup that
satisfiesOφ, so the reasoning task reduces to model checking
of gnd(φ). An important characteristic of standard names is
that, intuitively, a formula cannot distinguish the names it does
not mention. As a consequence, we can limit the grounding
gnd(φ) and quantification during the model checking to a finite
number of names. For every variable x in φ or ψ, let px be
the maximal number of variables occurring in any subformula
of φ or ψ of the same sort as x. It is then sufficient for the
grounding and for quantification of x to consider only the
names Nx(φ) ∪ Nx(ψ) plus px + 1 additional new names.
Given the finite grounding and quantification, splitting in Rules
8 and 11 can also be confined to finite many literals.
That way, the rules of the semantics of LL can be reduced
to only deal with finite structures, which immediately yields a
decision procedure forOφ |≈ Lkψ.
In the propositional case, this procedure is tractable:
Theorem 5 Let φ, ψ be propositional, φ be proper+, ψ be ob-
jective. ThenOφ |≈ Lkψ is decidable inO(2k(|φ|+|ψ|)k+2).
Now we turn to nested beliefs, which are handled using
Levesque’s representation theorem [Levesque, 1984a]. When
ψ mentions a free variable x, the idea is to replace a nested
belief Lkψ with all instances n for which Lkψxn holds. Given
a proper+ φ, a set of primitive terms T , and a formula Lkψ for
objective ψ, we define RES[φ, T,Lkψ] as
• if ψ mentions a free variable x:∨
n∈Nx(φ)∪Nx(ψ)(x= n ∧ RES[φ, T,Lkψxn]) ∨(∧
n∈Nx(φ)∪Nx(ψ) x 6= n ∧ RES[φ, T,Lkψxnˆ]nˆx
)
where nˆ ∈ Nx \ (Nx(φ) ∪Nx(ψ)) is a some new name;
• if ψ mentions no free variables:
TRUE if gnd(φ)|T |≈ Lkψ, and ¬TRUE otherwise, where
TRUE stands for ∃xx= x.
In our running example, RES[φ, T ,M1 fatherOf(Sally) 6= x]
is (x= Frank ∧ TRUE) ∨ (x= Fred ∧ TRUE) ∨ (x= Sally ∧
TRUE) ∨ (x 6= Frank ∧ x 6= Fred ∧ x 6= Sally ∧ TRUE), which
says that everybody is potentially not Sally’s father.
The RES operator can now be applied recursively to elimi-
nate nested beliefs from the inside to the outside. For proper+
φ, a set of terms T , and α withoutO, we define
• ‖t= t′‖φ,T as t= t′;
• ‖¬α‖φ,T as ¬‖α‖φ,T ;
• ‖(α ∨ β)‖φ,T as (‖α‖φ,T ∨ ‖β‖φ,T );
• ‖∃xα‖φ,T as ∃x‖α‖φ,T ;
• ‖Lkα‖φ,T as RES[φ, T,Lk‖α‖φ,T ];
• ‖Gα‖φ,T as ‖α‖φ,T∩T (gnd(α)).
Note that ‖ · ‖ works from the inside to the outside and always
returns an objective formula. In our example, ‖K1 . . . ‖φ,T
first determines RES[φ, T ,M1 fatherOf(Sally) 6= x], and
then RES[φ, T ,K1∃x(fatherOf(Sally) = x ∧ rich(x) = > ∧
RES[φ, T ,M1 fatherOf(Sally) 6= x)]] evaluates to TRUE.
Levesque’s representation theorem (transferred to LL)
states that this reduction is correct:
Theorem 6 Let φ be proper+, σ be subjective and withoutO.
ThenOφ |≈ σ iff |≈ ‖σ‖φ,T .
It follows that propositional reasoning is tractable:
Corollary 7 Let φ, σ be propositional, φ be proper+, σ be
subjective, and k ≥ l for every Kl ,Ml in σ. Then Oφ |≈ σ
is decidable in O(2k(|φ|+ |σ|)k+3).
4.2 Implementation
The reasoning system LIMBO implements the decision proce-
dure sketched in the previous subsection. LIMBO is written in
C++ and available as open source.3
Compared to literals in propositional logic, literals in our
first-order language are relatively complex objects. As we want
to adopt SAT solving technology, care was taken to keep literal
objects lightweight and efficient. To this end, a technique
called interning is used for terms, so that for every term only
one copy is created and stored in a pool, and the term from
then on is uniquely identified by a 31 bit number that points
to its full representation in the pool. With this lightweight
representation of terms, a literal fits into a single 64 bit number:
two 31 bit numbers for the left- and right-hand terms, and
one more bit to indicate whether the literal is an equality or
inequality. Furthermore, every term index encodes whether
the term is a standard name or not. Hence, all information
that is needed for the complement or subsumption tests for
two literals (as defined in Section 3.2) is stored directly in
the literal representation, so that these tests reduce to simple
bitwise operations on the literals’ 64 bit representation. Note
that this lightweight representation is supported by our strict
syntactic definition of a literal, which allows a function only on
3The system is available www.github.com/schwering/limbo.
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NYT easy NYT medium NYT hard Top 1465
clues 38.0 24.4 24.0 18.0
level 0 42.8 49.5 44.2 45.1
level 1 0.3 6.6 11.2 9.5
level 2 – 0.5 1.8 4.6
level 3 – – – 3.1
level 4 – – – 0.5
level 5 – – – 0.01
time 0.1 s 0.8 s 4.1 s 49.5 m
Table 1: Sudoku experiments over eight puzzles of each cat-
egory from The New York Times website as well as the first
125 of the “Top 1465” list. The rows show how many cells on
average per game were preset or solved at belief level 1, 2, 3,
4, or 5. The last row shows the average time per puzzle.
the left-hand side. An experiment showed that this lightweight
representation of terms and literals speeds up complement and
subsumption operations by a factor of 24 compared to the
naive representation.
Complement and subsumption tests for literals are mostly
used in the context of setups for determining unit propaga-
tion and subsumption. To avoid unnecessary blowup, invalid
literals in clauses as well as valid clauses in setups are not
represented explicitly. To facilitate fast unit propagation and
cheap backtracking during splitting, the setup data structure
uses the watched-literals scheme [Gomes et al., 2008]. Other
SAT technologies like backjumping or clause learning are not
used at the current stage. The setup data structure also provides
an operation to query the value of a primitive term, which is
used to optimise subformulas of the formKk t= x in queries.
Other than this special case, grounding and substitution
are handled naively at the moment and offer much room for
improvement. Within theG operator the system confines the
setup, which often reduces the branching factor for splitting
and thus improves performance. Note that in case of an incon-
sistent KB, using theG operator may violate soundness, as it
may discard the inconsistent clauses from the setup.
As mentioned before, predicates can be simulated using
functions and a name > that represents truth of the predicate.
Typically, > is of a specific sort (say, ‘Boolean’), and no other
names or variables of that sort occur in the KB or query. It is
noteworthy that this representation of predicates by functions
is free of overhead, because besides > only one other name
needs to be considered for splitting (to represent falsity).
The system also rewrites formulas, exploiting equivalences
that hold in L but not in LL like Proposition 1 (ii–iii), and
provides syntactic sugar for nested functions and the like.
4.3 Evaluation
Three sample applications were developed to evaluate the rea-
soning system.4 For one thing, a textual user interface allows
for specification of reasoning problems and has been used to
model several small-scale examples, including this paper’s
running example, to test the system’s full expressivity. In this
section, however, we focus on the application of limited belief
to the games of Sudoku and Minesweeper.
4Browser-based versions of these examples can be accessed at
www.cse.unsw.edu.au/~cschwering/limbo.
max level 8×8–10 16×16–40 16×30–99 32×64–320
0 rate 62.0% 46.0% 1.4% 28.3%time 0.01 s 0.06 s 0.24 s 5.08 s
1 rate 87.3% 84.9% 37.7% 69.8%time 0.01 s 0.08 s 0.43 s 5.46 s
2 rate 87.8% 85.0% 39.1% 70.0%time 0.02 s 0.10 s 0.64 s 5.60 s
3 rate 87.8% 85.0% 39.1% 70.0%time 0.07 s 0.25 s 4.94 s 5.90 s
Table 2: Minesweeper experiments over 1000 randomised runs
of different game configurations, where W×H–M means M
mines on a W×H grid. The rows contain results for different
maximum belief levels used by the reasoner to figure out
whether cells are safe or not. Rate denotes the percentage of
won games, time is the average time per game.
Sudoku is played on a 9×9 grid which is additionally di-
vided into nine 3×3 blocks. The goal is to find a valuation of
the cells such that every row, column, and 3×3 block contains
every value [1, 9] exactly once. The difficulty depends on how
many and which numbers are given as clues from the start.
In Minesweeper the goal is to explore a grid by uncovering
all and only those cells that contain no mine. When such a safe
cell is uncovered, the player learns how many adjacent cells
are safe, but when a mined cell is uncovered, the game is lost.
The difficulty depends on the number of mines and grid size.
Both games were played by simple agents that use the rea-
soning system to represent and infer knowledge about the cur-
rent game state. For Sudoku, we use a function value(x, y) ∈
[1, 9] and translate the game rules to constraints such as
y1 = y2 ∨ value(x, y1) 6= value(x, y2). For Minesweeper a
Boolean function isMine(x, y) is used, and when a cell (x, y)
is uncovered, clauses are added to represent the possible val-
uations of isMine(x ± 1, y ± 1). Both agents use iterative
deepening to find their next move: first, they look for a cell
(x, y) for which value(x, y) or isMine(x, y) is known at belief
level 0; if none exists, they repeat the same for belief level 1;
and so on, until a specified maximum level is reached. Once a
known cell is found, the corresponding information is added
to the knowledge base. In the case of Minesweeper, it is some-
times necessary to guess; we then use a naive strategy that
prefers cells that are not next to an uncovered field.
While both games do not require much expressivity to be
modelled, they are nevertheless interesting applications of
limited belief because they are known to be computationally
hard – Sudoku on N×N grids is NP-complete [Takayuki and
Takahiro, 2003], Minesweeper is co-NP-complete [Scott et al.,
2011] – yet often easily solved by humans. According to the
motivating hypothesis behind limited belief, a small split level
should often suffice to reach human-level performance. Indeed
we find this hypothesis confirmed for both games. The results
for Sudoku in Table 1 show that most ‘easy’ instances are
solved just by unit propagation, and the number of necessary
case splits increases for ‘medium’ and ‘hard.’ Significantly
more effort is needed to solve games from the “Top 1465” list,
a repository of extremely difficult Sudokus. For Minesweeper,
Table 2 shows that strong results are already achieved at level
1 already, and while belief level 2 increases the chance of
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winning by 0.5%, there is no improvement at level 3.
The Sudoku experiments show a strong increase in run-
time for higher belief levels. This is caused by the cells be-
ing highly connected through constraints, so that the G op-
erator has only little effect in terms of confining the setup
and relevant split terms. In Minesweeper, by contrast, us-
ingG improves runtime considerably. The experiments were
conducted using custom implementations of both games.
Note that while the numbers for Minesweeper are com-
petitive with those reported by [Bonet and Geffner, 2014;
Buffet et al., 2012], small differences in the rules may make
them incomparable. The tests were compiled with clang
-O3 and run on an Intel Core i7-4600U CPU at 3.3 GHz.
5 Conclusion
We developed a practical variant of Liu, Lakemeyer, and
Levesque’s [2004] theory of limited belief and introduced
and evaluated LIMBO, a reasoning system that implements
this logic. The system features a sorted first-order language of
introspective belief with functions and equality. The computa-
tional complexity of reasoning in this highly expressive logic
is controlled through the number of allowed case splits, which
keeps reasoning decidable in general and sometimes even
tractable. The motivating hypothesis behind limited belief is
that often a small number of case splits is sufficient to obtain
useful reasoning results; this hypothesis was confirmed in our
experimental evaluation using Sudoku and Minesweeper.
A natural next step is to incorporate (limited) theories of
action, belief change, and/or multiple agents into the system.
This could open up interesting applications in epistemic plan-
ning and high-level control in cognitive robotics. Another
challenge is to improve the system’s performance and expres-
sivity using SAT and ASP solving technology such as clause
learning, backjumping, efficient grounding techniques, and
background theories.
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We begin with some auxiliary definitions and basic lemmas in Appendix A and showing a unique-model property of limited
only-knowing in Appendix B. Then we proceed to show the soundness and eventual completeness results, Theorems 2 and
3, in Appendices C and D, respectively. Next, we prove the Levesque’s representation theorem for limited belief as stated in
Theorem 6 in Appendix E. Then we turn to the decidability result, Theorem 4, and the complexity analysis from Theorem 5 and
Corollary 7 in Appendix F.
All definitions are assumed as above. Some of them are restated, and, in some cases, refined, for convenience.
A Basics
Definition 8 (Term) The set of terms (of a sort s) contains all variables and names (of sort s) as well as all functions f(t1, . . . , tj)
where f is a j-ary function symbol (of sort s) and every ti is a variable or a name (not necessarily of sort s). We call a term
f(t1, . . . , tj) primitive when all ti are standard names. We denote by N and T be the sets of all names and primitive terms,
respectively. To include only terms of the same sort as t, we write Nt and Tt.
A.1 Literals
Definition 9 (Literal) A literal is an expression of the form t1 = t2 or ¬t1 = t2 where t1 is a variable, name, or function, and t2
is a variable or a name. A literal is ground when it contains no variables. Hence any ground literal is of the form n= n′, n 6= n′,
t= n, or t 6= n for names n, n′ and a primitive term t. Literals of the former two forms, t= n and t 6= n, are called primitive as
well. A clause is valid when it contains a valid literal, or a literal t= t′ and its negation t 6= t′, or two literals t 6= n1 and t 6= n2
for distinct names n1, n2. Analogously, a literal is invalid when it is of the form t 6= t, or n= n′ for distinct names n, n′, or t= t′
for terms t, t′ of distinct sorts.
Lemma 10 Let ` be ground. Then ` is valid iff |= `.
Proof. For the only-if direction, suppose ` is valid. When ` is of the form t= t or n 6= n′, the result immediately follows from
the semantics. When ` is of the form t 6= t′ for two terms of distinct sort, then Nt 3 w(t) 6= w(t′) ∈ Nt′ since Nt ∩ Nt′ = ∅,
and hence |= t 6= t′.
For the converse, suppose ` is not valid. A literal can have the following forms: n= n (*), n= n′, n 6= n, n 6= n′ (*), t= t (*),
t= n, t 6= n for same sorts, t 6= n for distinct sorts, for distinct n, n′ and a primitive t, all of, unless specified otherwise, perhaps
of different sorts. The cases marked (*) need no consideration as they are valid. Clearly, 6|= n= n′ and 6|= n 6= n. For t= n, there
is a w with w(t) 6= n, so 6|= t= n. For t 6= n of the same sort, there is a w with w(t) = n, so 6|= t 6= n.
Lemma 11 Let ` be ground. Then ` is invalid iff |= ¬`.
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Proof. For the only-if direction, suppose ` is invalid. When ` is of the form t 6= t or n= n′, the result immediately follows from
the semantics. When ` is of the form t= t′ for two terms of distinct sort, then Nt 3 w(t) 6= w(t′) ∈ Nt′ since Nt ∩ Nt′ = ∅,
and hence |= ¬t= t′.
For the converse, suppose ` is not invalid. A literal can have the following forms: n= n, n= n′ (*), n 6= n (*), n 6= n′, t= n
for same sorts, t= n for distinct sorts (*), t 6= t (*), t 6= n, for distinct n, n′ and a primitive t, all of, unless specified otherwise,
perhaps of different sorts. The cases marked (*) need no consideration as they are invalid. Clearly, 6|= ¬n= n and 6|= ¬n 6= n′.
For t= n of the same sorts, there is a w with w(t) = n, so 6|= ¬t= n. For t 6= n, there is a w with w(t) 6= n, so 6|= ¬t 6= n.
Lemma 12 Let ` be not valid and the left-hand side be a name. Then |= ¬`.
Proof. ` is of the form n= n (*), n 6= n, n= n′, or n 6= n′ (*) for distinct, n, n′. The cases marked (*) need no consideration as
they are valid. For the remaining cases, clearly |= ¬n 6= n and |= ¬n= n′.
Definition 13 (Literal subsumption, unit propagation) A literal `1 subsumes a literal `2 when `1, `2 are identical or `1, `2 are of
the form t = n1 and t 6= n2 for two distinct names n1, n2. Two literals `1, `2 are complementary when `1, `2 are of the form
t= t′ and t 6= t′ (or vice versa), or `1, `2 are of the form t= n1 and t= n2 for distinct names n1, n2.
Lemma 14 Suppose `1, `2 are ground and `1 subsumes `2. Then |= `1 ⊃ `2.
Proof. Suppose w |= `1. If `1, `2 are identical, the lemma holds trivially. If `1, `2 are of the form t= n1 and t 6= n2 for distinct
n1, n2 and w |= t= n1, then w(t) = n1 6= n2 and thus w |= t 6= t2.
Lemma 15 Suppose `1 subsumes `2 and `2 subsumes `3. Then `1 subsumes `3.
Proof. First suppose `1 and `2 are identical. If `2 and `3 are identical, then `1 subsumes `3 trivially. If `2, `3 are of the form
t= n2 and t 6= n3 for distinct n2, n3, then `1, `3 are of the form t= n2 and t 6= n3, so `1 subsumes `3.
Now suppose `1, `2 are of the form t = n1 and t 6= n2 for distinct n1, n2. If `2 and `3 are identical, then `1 subsumes `3
trivially. The remaining case that `2, `3 are of the form t= n′2 and t 6= n3 for distinct n′2, n3 is incompatible with the assumption
that `2 is of the form t 6= n2.
Lemma 16 Let `1 subsume `2 and `2 subsume `1. Then `1, `2 are identical.
Proof. By assumption, `1, `2 are identical or of the form t1 =n1 and t1 6=n2 for distinct n1, n2. Analogously, `2, `1 are identical
or of the form t1 = n1 and t1 6= n2 for distinct n1, n2. Hence `1, `2 must be identical.
Lemma 17 Suppose `1, `2 are ground and complementary. Then `1 ∧ `2 is unsatisfiable.
Proof. First `1, `2 are of the form t= t′ and t 6= t′. Then t′ is a name. If w(t) = t′, then w 6|= t 6= t′. If w(t) 6= t′, then w 6|= t= t′.
Now suppose `1, `2 are of the form t= n1 and t= n2 for distinct n1, n2. If w(t) = n1, then w 6|= t= n2. If w(t) 6= n1, then
w 6|= t= n1.
Lemma 18 Suppose `1 subsumes `2, `3 subsumes `4, and `2, `4 are complementary. Then `1, `3 are complementary.
Proof. By assumption, `1, `2 are identical or of the form t= n1 and t 6= n2 for distinct n1, n2. Analogously, `3, `4 are identical
or of the form t = n1 and t 6= n2 for distinct n1, n2. Moreover, `2, `4 are of the form t = t′ and t 6= t′, or t 6= t′ and t = t′, or
t= n1 and t= n2 for distinct n1, n2.
First suppose `1, `2 are identical. If `3, `4 are identical as well, the lemma holds trivially. Otherwise, `3, `4 are of the form
t= n1 and t 6= n2 for distinct n1, n2. Then `2 is of the form t= n2. Then `1 is of the form t= n2, too. Then `1, `3 are of the
form t= n2 and t= n1 and hence complementary.
Now suppose `1, `2 are of the form t = n1 and t 6= n2 for distinct n1, n2. Then `4 is of the form t = n2. Then `3 must be
identical to `4. Then `1, `3 are of the form t= n1 and t= n2 for distinct n1, n2, and thus complementary.
Remark 19 If `1, `2 are complementary and `2 subsumes `3, then `1, `3 are not necessarily complementary: `1, `2 could be
t 6= n1, t= n1, and `2, `3 could be t= n1, t 6= n2.
A.2 Clauses
Definition 20 (Clause) A clause is a set of literals. A clause with a single literal is a unit clause. We abuse notation and identify
the non-empty clauses {`1, . . . , `j} with formulas (`1 ∨ . . . ∨ `j). A clause is valid when it contains a valid literal, or a literal
t= t′ and its negation t 6= t′, or two literals t 6= n1 and t 6= n2 for distinct names n1, n2. A clause is invalid when all its literals
are invalid.
Lemma 21 A ground clause is valid iff |= c.
Proof. For the only-if direction, there are three cases. If a literal in c is valid, then by Lemma 10 the lemma holds. If two literals
t= t′ and t 6= t′ are in c, then w(t) = t′ or w(t) 6= t′ for every w and hence w |= c. If two literals t 6= n1 and t 6= n2 for distinct
n1, n2 are in c, then either w(t) 6= n1 or w(t) 6= n2 for every w and hence w |= c.
Conversely, suppose c is not valid. Then all its clauses are not valid and there are no two clauses of the form t= n and t 6= n or
t 6= n1 and t 6= n2 for distinct n1, n2. By Lemma 12, all literals without a primitive term on the left-hand side are unsatisfiable,
so we only need to to consider the literals of the form t= n and t 6= n. Let w be such that for every t 6= n ∈ c, w(t) = n. Such w
is well-defined because there are no two t 6= n1, t 6= n2 ∈ c for distinct n1, n2. Also note that for every t = n ∈ c there is no
t 6= n′ ∈ c, so we can furthermore let w(t) = nˆ, where nˆ /∈ {n¯ | t= n¯ ∈ c}. By construction, w 6|= c.
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Definition 22 (Clause subsumption, unit propagation) A clause c1 subsumes a clause c2 if every literal `1 ∈ c1 subsumes a
literal `2 ∈ c2. The unit propagation of a clause c with a literal ` is the clause obtained by removing from c all literals that are
complementary to `.
Lemma 23 Suppose c1 subsumes c2. Then |= c1 ⊃ c2.
Proof. Suppose w |= c1. Then w |= `1 for some `1 ∈ c1. By assumption, `1 subsumes some `2 ∈ c2. By Lemma 14, w |= `2.
Thus w |= c2.
Lemma 24 Suppose c1 subsumes c2 and c2 subsumes c3. Then c1 subsumes c3.
Proof. Let `1 ∈ c2 subsume `2, and `2 subsume `3 ∈ c3, which exist by assumption. By Lemma 15 the lemma follows.
Lemma 25 Let c1 subsume c2 and c2 subsume c1. Then c1, c2 are identical.
Proof. By assumption, every `1 ∈ c1 subsumes an `2 ∈ c2, and by Lemma 16, `1, `2 are identical, so c1 ⊆ c2. By the analogous
argument, c2 ⊆ c1.
Lemma 26 Suppose c2 is the unit propagation of c1, `. Then |= c1 ∧ ` ⊃ c2.
Proof. Suppose w |= c1 ∧ `. Then w |= `1 for some `1 ∈ c1. If `1, ` were complementary, then w 6|= `1 ∧ ` by Lemma 17, which
contradicts the assumption. Thus `1, ` are not complementary. Hence `1 ∈ c2 and thus w |= c2.
Lemma 27 Suppose c1 subsumes c2, `1 subsumes `2, and c′1 and c′2 are the unit propagations of c1 with `1 and c2 with `2. Then
c′1 subsumes c
′
2.
Proof. By assumption, every `′1 ∈ c1 subsumes an `′2 ∈ c2. By Lemma 18, if `′2 is complementary to `2, then `′1 is complementary
to `1. Hence, if `′1 ∈ c′1, then `′1 is not complementary to `1, and so the `′2 ∈ c2 which is subsumed by `′1 is not complementary
to `2 and hence `′2 ∈ c′2.
A.3 Setups
Definition 28 (Setup) A setup is a set of ground clauses. We write UP(s) to denote the closure of s together with all valid
clauses under unit propagation:
• if c ∈ s, then c ∈ UP(s);
• if ` is a valid literal, then ` ∈ UP(s);
• if c, ` ∈ UP(s) and c′ is the unit propagation of c with `, then c′ ∈ UP(s).
Furthermore s+ denotes the result of adding to s all clauses that are valid or subsumed by some clause in s. We further write s−
denote the setup obtained by removing from s all valid clauses and all clauses subsumed by some other clause in UP+(s). To ease
readability, we write UP−(s) for UP(s)− and UP+(s) for UP(s)+. A setup s subsumes a clause c when some c′ ∈ s subsumes c.
Lemma 29 The following are equivalent:
(i) w |= c for all c ∈ s;
(ii) w |= c for all c ∈ s−;
(iii) w |= c for all c ∈ s+;
(iv) w |= c for all c ∈ UP(s).
Proof. We show that (i) is equivalent to (ii), (iii), (iv). The remaining equivalences then follow.
The only-if direction of (i) iff (ii) is trivial. Conversely, suppose (ii) and c ∈ s and c /∈ s−. Then c is either valid or subsumed
by some other clause. In the first case, w |= c by Lemma 21. In the second case, there is some c′ ∈ s− that subsumes c by
Lemmas 24 and 25. By assumption, w |= c′, and by Lemma 23 w |= c.
The if direction of (i) iff (iii) is trivial. Conversely, suppose (i) and c ∈ s+ and c /∈ s. Then c is either valid or subsumed by
some other clause c′ ∈ s. In the first case, w |= c by Lemma 21. In the second case, w |= c′ by assumption, and by Lemma 23
w |= c.
The if direction of (i) iff (iv) is trivial. Conversely suppose (i) and c ∈ UP(s). We show by induction on the length of the
derivation of c that w |= c.
• The base case for valid ` follows by Lemma 10.
• The base case c ∈ s is trivial.
• For the induction step, let c ∈ UP(s) be the resolvent of c′, ` ∈ UP(s). By induction, w |= c′ and w |= `. By Lemma 26,
w |= c.
Definition 30 Let UPk(s) be the set of clauses derivable by at most k unit propagations from s together with all valid literals.
Lemma 31 Let s ⊆ s′. Then UP(s) ⊆ UP(s′) and UP+(s) ⊆ UP+(s′).
Proof. We first show that if c ∈ UP(s) then c ∈ UP(s′) by induction on the length of the derivation of c.
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• If c ∈ UP0(s), then c is either valid or c ∈ s ⊆ s′, and so c ∈ UP0(s′).
• If c ∈ UPk+1(s) \ UPk(s), then c is the unit propagation of c′, ` ∈ UPk(s). By induction, c′, ` ∈ UPk(s′), and so
c ∈ UPk+1(s′).
Finally, if c ∈ UP+(s), then c is valid or subsumed by some c′ ∈ UP(s) ⊆ UP(s′), so c ∈ UP+(s′).
Lemma 32
(i) s ⊆ s′ implies s+ ⊆ s′+;
(ii) s− ⊆ s′− implies s+ ⊆ s′+;
(iii) s− = s′− iff s+ = s′+.
Proof.
(i) Suppose s ⊆ s′ and let c ∈ s+. If c is valid, then c ∈ s′+. Otherwise c is subsumed by some c′ ∈ s. By assumption, c′ ∈ s′,
and so c′ ∈ s′+. Hence c ∈ s′+.
(ii) Suppose s− ⊆ s′− and let c ∈ s+. If c is valid, then c ∈ s′+. Otherwise c is subsumed by a clause in s, and by Lemmas 24
and 25, c is subsumed by some c′ ∈ s−. By assumption, c′ ∈ s′−, and so c′ ∈ s′+. Hence also c ∈ s′+.
(iii) Suppose s+ = s′+ and let c ∈ s−. Since s− ⊆ s+, we have c ∈ s+, and by assumption, c ∈ s′+. Moreover, c is not valid and
not subsumed by any clause in s by assumption. Then c is also not subsumed by any clause in s+ = s′+, and in particular,
not subsumed by any clause in s′. Hence c ∈ s′−.
Lemma 33 Let f(s) ∈ {UP+(s),UP−(s)}.
(i) f(s ∪ s′) = f(s− ∪ s′);
(ii) f(s ∪ s′) = f(s+ ∪ s′);
(iii) f(s ∪ s′) = f(UP(s) ∪ s′).
Proof.
(i) First consider UP+(s ∪ s′) = UP+(s− ∪ s′). The ⊇ direction follows from Lemma 31 since s ∪ s′ ⊇ s− ∪ s′. Conversely,
suppose c ∈ UP+(s ∪ s′). If c is valid, then c ∈ UP+(s− ∪ s′). Otherwise c is subsumed by some clause in UP(s ∪ s′),
and by Lemmas 24 and 25, c is subsumed by some c′UP(s ∪ s′) which itself is not subsumed by any clause UP(s ∪ s′).
We show by induction on the length of the derivation of c′ that c′ ∈ UP(s− ∪ s′), which implies c ∈ UP+(s− ∪ s′).
• If c′ ∈ UP0(s− ∪ s′), then c′ is a valid literal or c′ ∈ s− ∪ s, and hence c′ ∈ UP0(s− ∪ s′).
• If c′ ∈ UPk+1(s∪s′)\UPk(s∪s′), then it is the unit propagation of some c′′, ` ∈ UPk(s∪s′) that are not subsumed
by any clause in UPk(s ∪ s′). For otherwise either the empty clause were in UPk(s ∪ s′), or the unit propagation of
the subsuming clauses would subsume c by Lemma 27, both of which would contradict the assumption. By induction,
c′′, ` ∈ UPk(s− ∪ s′), and so c′ ∈ UPk+1(s− ∪ s′).
The claim UP−(s ∪ s′) = UP−(s− ∪ s′) follows by Lemma 32.
(ii) Now consider UP−(s ∪ s′) = UP−(s+ ∪ s′). By (i), UP−(s+ ∪ s′) = UP−((s+) ∪ s′−). Since (s+)− = s−, we have
UP−(s+ ∪ s′) = UP−(s− ∪ s′), and again by (i), UP−(s− ∪ s′) = UP−(s ∪ s′).
The claim UP+(s ∪ s′) = UP+(s− ∪ s′) follows by Lemma 32.
(iii) Now consider UP+(s∪s′) = UP+(UP(s)∪s′). The⊆ direction holds by Lemma 31 since s∪s′ ⊆ UP(s)∪s′. Conversely,
suppose c ∈ UP+(UP(s)∪s′). If c is valid, then c ∈ UP+(s∪s′). Otherwise c is subsumed by some c′ ∈ UPk(UPl(s)∪s′)
for some k, l. We show by induction on l and subinduction on k that c′ ∈ UPk+l(s ∪ s′), which implies c ∈ UP+(s ∪ s′).
• For the base case let l = 0. Then UPk(UP0(s) ∪ s′) = UPk(s ∪ s′), so the claim holds.
• Now consider l > 0 and suppose c′ ∈ UPk(UPl(s) ∪ s′). We show that c′ ∈ UPk+l(s ∪ s′) by subinduction on k.
For k = 0, UP0(UPl(s) ∪ s′) ⊆ UPl(s ∪ s′), so the claim holds. For k > 0, suppose c′ ∈ UPk(UPl(s) ∪ s′) and
that c′ is the unit propagation of two clauses c′′, ` ∈ UPk−1(UPl(s) ∪ s′). By induction, c′′, ` ∈ UPk−1+l(s ∪ s′).
Hence c ∈ UPk+l(s ∪ s′).
The claim UP−(s ∪ s′) = UP−(s− ∪ s′) follows by Lemma 32.
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A.4 Formulas
Definition 34 (Formula) The set of formulas is the least set that contains all literals and all expressions ¬α, (α∨ β), ∃xα,Kkα,
Mkα,Oα,Gα where α and β are formulas, x is a variable, and k ≥ 0 is a natural number. To denote the names or primitive
terms that occur in a formula α, we write N (α) and T (α), respectively, optionally indexed with a term t to restrict the set to
terms of the same sort as t; and analogously for sets of formulas. We use L as a placeholder forK andM .
Definition 35 (Length) The length |α| of a formula α is defined as follows:
• |t= t′| = 3;
• |(α ∨ β)| = 3 + |α|+ |β|;
• |¬α| = 2m(α) + |α|;
• |∃xα| = 1 + |α|;
• |Lkα| = k + 1 + |α|;
• |Oφ| = 1 + |φ|;
• |Gα| = 1 + |α|;
where m(α) is the number of modal operators in α.
The point of defining |¬α| = 2m(α) + |α| is that |¬Lkα| > |Lk¬α| and likewise |¬Gα| > |G¬α|.
B Only-Knowing
In this section we show Theorem 38, which says that limited only-knowing has a unique model (modulo unit propagation and
subsumption).
Lemma 36 Let f(s) ∈ {UP(s), s−, s+}. Then s0, s ∪ s′, v |≈ α iff s0, f(s) ∪ s′, v∪ |≈ α iff f(s0), s ∪ s′, v |≈ α.
Proof. By induction on |α|.
• For the base case consider a clause c, which includes the base cases for ` and a clause (α ∨ β). Then s0, s ∪ s′, v |≈ c iff
c ∈ UP+(s ∪ s′) iff c ∈ UP+(f(s) ∪ s′) iff s0, f(s) ∪ s′, v |≈ c. Moreover s0, s ∪ s′, v |≈ c iff f(s0), s ∪ s′, v |≈ c.
• The induction steps for ¬(α ∨ β), ∃xα, ¬∃xα, and ¬¬α are trivial.
• Now considerK0α. Firstly, s0, s∪s′, v |≈ K0α iff s0∪v is obviously inconsistent or s0, s0∪v |≈ α iff s0, f(s)∪s′, v |≈ K0 .
Secondly, s0, s ∪ s′, v |≈ K0α iff s0 ∪ v is obviously inconsistent or s0, s0 ∪ v |≈ α iff (by induction and by the fact that
UP+(s0 ∪ v) = UP+(f(s0) ∪ v)) f(s0) ∪ v is obviously inconsistent or f(s0), f(s0) ∪ v |≈ α iff f(s0), s ∪ s′, v |≈ K0α.
• Now considerKk+1α. Firstly, s0, s ∪ s′, v |≈ Kk+1α iff for some t and all n ∈ Nt, s0, s ∪ s′, v ∪ {t= n} |≈ Kkα iff (by
induction) for some t and all n ∈ Nt, s0, f(s) ∪ s′, v ∪ {t= n} |≈ Kkα iff s0, f(s) ∪ s′, v |≈ Kk+1α. Analogously for
the second claim.
• Now consider M0α. Firstly, s0, s ∪ s′, v |≈ M0α iff s0 ∪ v is not potentially inconsistent and s0, s0 ∪ v |≈ α iff
s0, f(s) ∪ s′, v |≈ M0 . Secondly, s0, s ∪ s′, v |≈ M0α iff s0 ∪ v is not potentially inconsistent s0, s0 ∪ v |≈ α iff (by
induction and by the fact that UP−(s0∪v) = UP−(f(s0)∪v)) f(s0)∪v is not potentially inconsistent f(s0), f(s0)∪v |≈ α
iff f(s0), s ∪ s′, v |≈M0α.
• Now consider Mk+1α. Firstly, s0, s ∪ s′, v |≈ Mk+1α iff for some t and n ∈ Nt, s0, s ∪ s′, v ∪ {t = n} |≈ Mkα
or s0, s ∪ s′, v unionmultis0 (t = n) |≈ α iff (by induction) for some t and all n ∈ Nt, s0, f(s) ∪ s′, v ∪ {t = n} |≈ Mkα iff
s0, f(s)∪ s′, v |≈Mk+1α. Secondly, s0, s∪ s, v |≈Mk+1α iff for some t and n ∈ Nt, s0, s∪ s′, v ∪ {t= n} |≈Mkα or
s0, s ∪ s′, v unionmultis0 (t= n) |≈ α iff (by induction and by the fact that UP+(s0 ∪ v) = UP+(f(s) ∪ v)) for some t and n ∈ Nt,
f(s0), s ∪ s′, v ∪ {t= n} |≈Mkα or f(s0), s ∪ s′, v unionmultif(s0) (t= n) |≈ α iff f(s0), s ∪ s′, v |≈ α.
• Firstly, s0, s∪s′, v |≈ Gα iff s0|T (gnd(α)), s∪s′, v |≈ α iff (by induction) s0|T (gnd(α)), f(s)∪s′, v |≈ α iff s0, f(s)∪s′, v |≈
α. Secondly, s0, s∪s′, v |≈ Gα iff s0|T (gnd(α)), s∪s′, v |≈ α iff (by induction and by the fact that UP−(s0) = UP−(f(s0)))
f(s0)|T (gnd(α)), s ∪ s′, v |≈ α iff f(s0), s ∪ s′, v |≈ α.
• The induction steps for ¬Kkα, ¬Mkα, and ¬Gα are trivial.
Lemma 37 Let φ be proper+. Then s0 |≈ Oφ iff UP+(s0) = UP+(gnd(φ)).
Proof. For the only-if direction suppose s0 |≈ Oφ. Then s0, s0 |≈ φ. Then gnd(φ) ⊆ UP+(s0), and hence clearly
UP+(gnd(φ)) ⊆ UP+(s0). Moreover, s0, gnd(φ) |≈ φ, and by assumption, there is no sˆ0 with UP+(sˆ0) ⊆ UP+(s0) and
s0, sˆ0 |≈ φ. Thus UP+(gnd(φ)) ⊇ UP+(s0). Together, this gives UP+(s0) = UP+(gnd(φ)).
For the if direction suppose UP+(s0) = UP+(gnd(φ)). Then c ∈ UP+(s0) for every c ∈ gnd(φ), so s0, s0 |≈ c, and thus
s0, s0 |≈ φ. Suppose sˆ0 is such that UP+(sˆ0) ( UP+(s0). Let c ∈ UP+(s0) but c /∈ UP+(sˆ0). Then c is not valid. If c is
subsumed by some other clause c′ ∈ UP+(s0), then c′ /∈ UP+(sˆ0); hence we can assume that c is not subsumed by any other
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clause in UP+(s0). If c is the unit propagation of two clauses c′, ` ∈ UP+(s0), then c′, ` /∈ UP+(sˆ0); hence we can assume that c
is not the unit propagation of any other clauses. By these assumptions and since UP+(s0) = UP+(gnd(φ)), we have c ∈ gnd(φ)
but c /∈ UP+(sˆ0). Hence s0, sˆ0 6|≈ φ.
Theorem 38 Let φ be proper+.Oφ |≈ α iff gnd(φ) |≈ α.
Proof. For the only-if direction, supposeOφ |≈ α. By Lemma 37, gnd(φ) |≈ Oφ, and hence gnd(φ) |≈ α. Conversely, suppose
gnd(φ) |≈ α and s0 |≈ Oφ. By Lemma 37, UP+(s0) = UP+(gnd(φ)), and by Lemma 36, s0 |≈ α.
C Soundness
In this section we prove Theorem 2 that states the soundness of limited belief.
Definition 39 We denote by σL the result of replacing in σ every Lk with L . We abbreviate [φ] = {w | w |= φ}, and
[Φ] =
⋂
φ∈Φ[φ].
Lemma 40 Suppose s is obviously inconsistent. Then there is no w such that w |= c for all c ∈ s.
Proof. Suppose w |= c for all c ∈ s. By Lemma 29, w |= c for all c ∈ s+. By assumption, n 6= n ∈ s+. Thus w |= n 6= n.
Contradiction.
Lemma 41 Suppose s is not potentially inconsistent. Then there is a w such that w |= c for all c ∈ s.
Proof. Let L = {` | ` ∈ c ∈ UP−(s)}. By assumption, L contains no two complementary literals and for no t all t = n for
n ∈ Nt occur in UP−(s). Let w be such that w(t) = n for every t= n ∈ L. Such w is well-defined because by assumption, if
t = n ∈ L, then n ∈ Nt for otherwise it would contain complementary literals, and neither t 6= n ∈ L nor t = n′ ∈ L for n′
distinct from n. Moreover for every t 6= n ∈ L there is an n′ ∈ Nt such that t 6= n′ /∈ L, so we can let w(t) = n′. By assumption,
s is not obviously inconsistent, so every clause in s is subsumed by a literal in L. Hence by construction w |= c for every
c ∈ s.
Lemma 42 For all s1, s2, s0, s1, v |≈ Lkα iff s0, s2, v |≈ Lkα.
Proof. By induction on k. Base case and induction step are obvious as s1, s2 are not mentioned on the right-hand sides of the
semantic rules.
Lemma 43 Suppose s0, s, v |≈Mkα. Then there is a w such that w |= c for all c ∈ s0.
Proof. By induction on k.
• Base case k = 0: since s0, s, v |≈M0α requires s0 ∪ v to be not potentially inconsistent, which by Lemma 41 gives the
lemma.
• The induction step is trivial.
Lemma 44 Let φ be proper+, α be withoutO,G, and without negated Lk , and [s0] = gnd(φ). For every UP+(s) ⊇ UP+(s0),
if s0, s |≈ α, then [s0], w |= α for all w ∈ [s].
Proof. We first prove the lemma by induction on |α|.
• For the base case consider a clause c, which includes the base cases for ` and a clause (α ∨ β). Suppose s0, s |≈ c. Then
c ∈ UP+(s). Then for all w with w |= c′ for all c′ ∈ UP+(s) also w |= c. By Lemma 29, for every w with w |= c′ for all
c′ ∈ s also w |= c. Thus e, w |= c for all w ∈ [s].
• The induction steps for ¬(α ∨ β), ∃xα, ¬∃xα, and ¬¬α are trivial.
• ConsiderKkα. We define e0, e |= KαL iff e0, w |= KαL for allw ∈ e. We show by subinduction on k that s0, s, v |≈ Kkα
implies [s0], [s0 ∪ v] |= KαL. Since [s0] = [s0 ∪ ∅], we obtain that s0, s |≈ Kkα implies [s0] |= KαL.
Consider k = 0 and suppose s0, s, v |≈ K0α. If s ∪ v is obviously inconsistent, then by Lemma 40, [s ∪ v] = ∅ and
hence trivially [s0], [s0 ∪ v] |= KαL. If s0, s0 ∪ v |≈ α, then by induction [s0], w |≈ αL for all w ∈ [s0 ∪ v]. Then
[s0], [s0 ∪ v] |= KαL.
Consider k + 1 and suppose s0, s, v |≈ Kk+1α. For some t ∈ T and all n ∈ Nt, s0, s, v ∪ {t = n} |≈ Kk+1α. By
subinduction, for all n ∈ Nt, [s0], [s0 ∪ v ∪ {t= n}] |= KαL. Since [s0 ∪ v] = [s0 ∪ v ∪ {t= n}], [s0], [s0 ∪ v] |≈ KαL.
• ConsiderMkα. We show by subinduction on k that s0, s, v |≈Mkα implies [s0] |≈MαL.
Consider k = 0 and suppose s0, s, v |≈M0α. By assumption, s0 ∪ v is not potentially inconsistent, and s0, s0 ∪ v |≈ α.
Then by Lemma 41, [s0 ∪ v] 6= ∅, and by induction, [s0], w |= αL for all w ∈ [s0 ∪ v]. In particular, there is w ∈ [s0 ∪ v]
such that [s0], w |= αL. Thus the same w ∈ [s0] satisfies [s0], w |= αL. Thus [s0] |= MαL.
Consider k+1 and suppose s0, s, v |≈Mk+1α. Then for some t=n, either s0, s, v∪{t=n} |≈Mkα or s0, s, vunionmultis0(t=n) |≈
Mkα. In either case by subinduction [s0] |= MαL.
Lemma 45 Let φ be proper+, σ be subjective, withoutO,G, and without negated Lk , and [s0] = gnd(φ). If s0, ∅ |≈ σ, then
[s0] |= σ.
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Proof. By induction on |σ|.
• For the base case consider a clause c, which includes the base cases for ` and a clause (α ∨ β). By assumption, c ∈ UP+(∅),
so c is valid, and by Lemma 21, [s0] |= c.
• The induction steps for ¬(α ∨ β), ∃xα, ¬∃xα, and ¬¬α are trivial.
• Now considerK0α. If s0, ∅ |≈ Kkα, then by Lemma 42, s0, [s0], ∅ |≈ Kkα, and by the Lemma 44, [s0], w |= KαL for
all w ∈ [s0], and so [s0] |= KKαL and thus [s0] |≈ KαL.
• Now considerM0α. If s0, ∅ |≈Mkα, then by Lemma 42, s0, [s0], ∅ |≈Mkα, and by the Lemma 44, [s0], w |= MαL for
all w ∈ [s0], and since [s0] 6= ∅ by Lemma 43, [s0] |= MαL.
Theorem 2 (Soundness) Let φ be proper+, σ be subjective, withoutO,G, and without negated Lk . IfOφ |≈ σ, thenOφ |= σL.
Proof. Suppose Oφ |≈ σ and e |= Oφ. Let s0 = gnd(φ). Then [s0] is the unique set of worlds such that [s0] |= Oφ, so we
need to show that [s0] |= σL. By Theorem 38, s0 |≈ Oφ, and by assumption, s0 |≈ σ. Then s0, ∅ |≈ σ, and by Lemma 45,
[s0] |= σL.
D Eventual Completeness
Here we prove the eventual completeness result for propositional limited belief, Theorem 3.
Definition 46 A formula without quantifiers is called propositional.
Definition 47 Let s(w, T ) = s ∪ {t= n | w(t) = n and t ∈ T}.
Lemma 48 Lkα |≈ Lk+1α.
Proof. By induction on k. Suppose s0 |≈ Lkα.
• If s0, s, v |≈ K0α, then s0 is obviously inconsistent or s0, s0 ∪ v, ∅ |≈ α. Let t /∈ T (s0 ∪ v ∪ {α}) be a primitive term and
n ∈ Tt be arbitrary. If s0 is obviously inconsistent, then clearly s0 ∪ {t= n} is obviously inconsistent. If s0, s0 ∪ v, ∅ |≈ α,
then s0, s0 ∪ v ∪ {t= n}, ∅ |≈ α, as can be shown by a trivial induction on |α|. In either case, s0, s, v ∪ {t= n} |≈ K0α
for every n ∈ Tt. Then s0, s, v |≈ K1α.
• If s0, s, v |≈M0α, then s0 is not potentially inconsistent and s0, s0 ∪ v, ∅ |≈ α. Let t /∈ T (s0 ∪ v ∪ {α}) be a primitive
term and n ∈ Tt be arbitrary. Then clearly s0 ∪ {t = n} is not potentially inconsistent, and as in the case for K0 ,
s0, s0 ∪ v ∪ {t= n}, ∅ |≈ α. In either case, s0, s, v ∪ {t= n} |≈M0α. Then s0, s, v |≈M1α.
• The induction step is trivial.
Lemma 49 Let s0, s |≈ α and s′ ⊇ s. Then s0, s′ |≈ α.
Proof. By induction on |α|.
• For every clause c with s0, s |≈ c, we have c ∈ UP+(s) ⊆ UP+(s′), and thus s0, s′ |≈ c.
• The induction steps are trivial.
Lemma 50 Let s0 be finite, α be propositional, s ⊇ s0, T ⊇ T (s0 ∪ {α}), and T ′ = {t1, . . . , tj} ⊆ T be maximal such that
for every n ∈ Nt, t= n /∈ s0. If s0, s(w, T ) |≈ α for all w ∈ [s0], then s0, s ∪ {t1 = n1, . . . , tj = nj} |≈ α for all ni ∈ Nti .
Proof. By induction on j. Suppose s0, s(w, T ) |= αL for all w ∈ [s0].
• Suppose j = 0.
If there is some w ∈ [s0], then s(w, T ) = s, for otherwise there is a t ∈ T \ T ′ such that t= n ∈ s and w(t) 6= n and thus
w 6|= t= n, which contradicts the assumption. The claim follows trivially s(w, T ) = s.
Otherwise, for every w there must be some c ∈ s0 ⊆ s such that w 6|= c, which implies w |= ¬` for every ` ∈ c. This
implies that such ` is not valid by Lemma 10, and since ` mentions a name on the left-hand side by assumption, |= ¬` by
Lemma 12, so ` is of the form n 6= n or n= n′ for two distinct names n, n′. As n= n, n 6= n′ ∈ UP(s) since they are valid
literals, UP(s) contains the empty clause. A simple subinduction on |α| then shows that s0, s |≈ α.
• Now consider j + 1 and suppose the claim holds for {t1, . . . , tj}. Suppose s0, (s ∪ {tj+1 = nj+1}(w, T ) |≈ α for all
w ∈ [s0]. By Lemma 49, s0, (s ∪ {tj+1 = nj+1})(w, T ) |= αL for every nj+1 ∈ Ntj+1 and all w ∈ [s0]. By induction,
s0, s ∪ {t1 = n1, . . . , tj+1 = nj+1} |≈ α.
Lemma 51 Let s0 be finite, T ⊇ T (s0 ∪ {α}), and T ′ = {t1, . . . , tj} ⊆ T be maximal such that for every n ∈ Nt, t= n /∈ s0.
If [s0] = ∅, then s0 ∪ {t1 = n1, . . . , tj = nj} is obviously inconsistent.
Proof. Suppose [s0] = ∅. By Lemma 50, s0∪{t1=n1, . . . , tj=nj} |≈ n 6=n for arbitrary n. ThenUP+(s0∪{t1=n1, . . . , tj=nj})
must contain the empty clause and therefore it is obviously inconsistent.
Lemma 52 Let s0 be finite, w ∈ [s0], and T ⊇ T (s0), α be propositional. Then s0(w, T ) is not potentially inconsistent.
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Proof. By assumption, w |= c for all c ∈ s0. Furthermore, w |= t= n for every primitive term t, in particular for t ∈ T , and
name n identical to w(t). Thus w |= c for all c ∈ s0(w, T ). By Lemma 40, s0(w, T ) is not obviously inconsistent
By Lemma 29, w |= c for every c ∈ UP(s0(w, T )). Thus for every clause c ∈ UP(s0(w, T )), there is some ` ∈ c such
that w |= `. If ` is of the form t = n, then w(t) = n and hence t = n ∈ UP(s0(w, T )). If ` is of the form t 6= n′, then
w(t) = n for some distinct n and hence t= n ∈ UP(s0(w, T )). In either case, t= n subsumes c, and so either c is just the unit
clause t = n or c /∈ UP−(s0(w, T )). Since s0(w, T ) is not obviously inconsistent, there is at most one one n per t such that
t= n ∈ UP−(s0(w, T )). Thus s0(w, T ) is not potentially inconsistent.
Lemma 53 Let s0 be finite, αk be propositional with l ≥ k for every Ll it mentions, and T ⊇ T (s0 ∪ {αk}). If w ∈ [s0] with
[s0], w |= αL, then s0, s0(w, T ) |≈ α|T |.
Proof. By induction on |αk|.
• Suppose w ∈ [s0] and [s0], w |= c. Then w |= ` for some ` ∈ c. If ` has a function as left-hand side, then ` ∈ s0(w, T ).
Otherwise, |= `, and by Lemma 10, ` ∈ UP(s0(w, T )). Thus s0, s0(w, T ) |≈ c.
• The induction steps for ¬(α ∨ β), ∃xα, ¬∃xα, and ¬¬α are trivial.
• Suppose w ∈ [s0] and [s0], w |= KαL. Then [s0] 6= ∅. Then [s0], w′ |= αL for all w′ ∈ [s0]. By induction, s0, s0(w′, T ) |≈
α|T | for all w′ ∈ [s0]. By Lemma 50, s0, s0 ∪ {t1 = n1, . . . , tj = nj} |≈ α|T | for all ni ∈ Nti . Thus s0 |≈ K jα|T |. By
Lemma 48, s0 |≈ Klα|T | for arbitrary l ≥ |T |.
• Suppose w ∈ [s0] and [s0], w |= ¬KαL. Then [s0], w 6|= KαL. By Theorem 2, s0 6|≈ Klα for arbitrary l. Thus
s0 |≈ ¬Klα.
• Suppose w ∈ [s0] and [s0], w |= MαL. Then [s0] 6= ∅. Then [s0], w′ |= αL for some w′ ∈ [s0]. By induction,
s0, s0(w
′, T ) |≈ α|T | for this w′. By Lemma 52, s0(w′, T ) is not potentially inconsistent. Thus and since s0(w′, T ) is the
result of adding |T | equality literals to s0, we have s0 |≈M |T |α. By Lemma 48, s0 |≈Mlα|T | for arbitrary l ≥ |T |.
• Suppose w ∈ [s0] and [s0], w |= ¬MαL. Then [s0], w 6|= MαL. By Theorem 2, s0 6|≈ Mlα for arbitrary l. Thus
s0 |≈ ¬Mlα.
Lemma 54
(i) If s0 |≈ Kkα, then s0 6|≈Ml¬α.
(ii) If s0 |≈Mkα, then s0 6|≈ Kl¬α.
Proof.
(i) Suppose s0 |≈ Kkα. Then [s0] |= KαL by Theorem 2. Then [s0] 6|= M¬αL. Then s0 6|≈Ml¬α by Theorem 2.
(ii) Suppose s0 |≈Mkα. Then [s0] |= MαL by Theorem 2. Then [s0] 6|= K¬αL. Then s0 6|≈ Kl¬α by Theorem 2.
Theorem 3 (Eventual completeness) Let φ, σl be propositional, φ be proper+, σl be subjective, withoutO,G, and k ≥ l for all
Lk in σl. ThenOφ |= σL implies that there is a k such thatOφ |≈ σk.
Proof. Let s0 = gnd(φ), which is the unique (modulo UP+) model ofOφ, and [s0] |= Oφ. Let k = |T (s0 ∪ {σ})|. The proof
is by induction on |σ|.
• For the base case suppose [s0] |= c for a clause c, which includes the base cases for ` and a clause (α ∨ β). Then c is valid
by Lemma 21, and hence c ∈ UP+(s), and so s0, s |≈ c.
• The induction steps for ¬(α ∨ β), ∃xα, ¬∃xα, and ¬¬α are trivial.
• Suppose [s0] |= KαL. If [s0] 6= ∅, then by Lemma 53 s0 |≈ Klα for arbitrary l ≥ k. If [s0] = ∅, then by Lemma 51 there
are t1, . . . , tk terms such that s0 ∪ {t1 = n1, . . . , tk = nk} is obviously inconsistent for all ni ∈ Nti , and hence s0 |≈ Klα
for arbitrary l ≥ k.
• Suppose [s0] |= ¬KαL. Then [s0] |= M¬αL. Then s0 |≈ Ml¬α for arbitrary l ≥ k. Then s0 6|≈ Kl¬¬α for arbitrary
l ≥ k by Lemma 54. Then s0 |≈ ¬Klα for arbitrary l ≥ k.
• Suppose [s0] |= MαL. Then [s0] 6= ∅, and by Lemma 53, s0 |≈Mlα for arbitrary l ≥ k.
• Suppose [s0] |= ¬MαL. Then [s0] |= K¬αL. Then s0 |≈ Kl¬α for arbitrary l ≥ k. Then s0 6|≈ Ml¬¬α for arbitrary
l ≥ k by Lemma 54. Then s0 |≈ ¬Mlα for arbitrary l ≥ k.
E Representation Theorem
This section proves the limited version of Levesque’s representation theorem, Theorem 6. A key lemma on the way is Lemma 64
about the RES operator.
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E.1 The RES Operator
Definition 55 Let φ be proper+, T be a set of primitive terms, and ψ be objective. Then RES[φ, T,Lkψ] is defined as follows:
• if ψ mentions a free variable x:∨
n∈Nx(φ)∪Nx(ψ)(x= n ∧ RES[φ, T,Lkψxn]) ∨(∧
n∈Nx(φ)∪Nx(ψ) x 6= n ∧ RES[φ, T,Lkψxnˆ]nˆx
)
where nˆ ∈ Nx \ (Nx(φ) ∪Nx(ψ)) is a some new name;
• if ψ mentions no free variables:
TRUE if gnd(φ)|T |≈ Lkψ, and ¬TRUE otherwise,
where TRUE stands for ∃xx= x.
Definition 56 A name involution is a sort-preserving bijection ∗ : N → N such that n∗∗ = n.
Lemma 57 Suppose T (s0) and T (s1) are disjoint, and c ∈ UP(s0 ∪ s1) mentions terms from T (si) or no terms at all. Then
c ∈ UP(si) or s1−i is obviously inconsistent.
Proof. By induction on the length of the derivation of c.
• For the base case, if c ∈ s0 ∪ s1 mentions a term from T (si), then c ∈ UP(si).
• For the induction step, suppose c is the unit propagation of c′, ` ∈ UP(s0 ∪ s1).
First suppose ` is valid and c′ mentions terms from T (si). By induction, c′ ∈ UP(si). Then c ∈ UP(si). Since T (c) ⊆ T (c′)
and if c is the empty clause then si is obviously inconsistent, the lemma follows.
Now suppose ` is invalid. By induction, ` ∈ UP(si) or s1−i is obviously inconsistent. Then s0 or s1 are obviously
inconsistent.
Finally suppose ` is neither valid nor invalid. Then ` must mention a term, and c′ must also mention that term. By induction,
c′, ` ∈ UP(si). Then c ∈ UP(si). Since T (c) ⊆ T (c′) and if c is the empty clause then si is obviously inconsistent, the
lemma follows.
Lemma 58 Suppose T (c) ∪ T (s1) and T (s2) are disjoint. Then c ∈ UP+(s1 ∪ s2) iff c ∈ UP+(s1) or s2 is potentially
inconsistent.
Proof. The if direction is trivial. Conversely, suppose c ∈ UP+(s1 ∪ s2). Then c is subsumed by some c′ ∈ UP(s1 ∪ s2). Then
T (c′) ⊆ T (c). By Lemma 57, c′ ∈ UP(s1) or s2 is obviously inconsistent, and so the lemma holds.
Lemma 59 Let f(s) ∈ {UP(s), s−, s+} and ∗ be a name involution. Then f(s)∗ = f(s∗).
Proof.
• We first show UP(s)∗ = UP(s∗).
For the ⊆ direction suppose c∗ ∈ UP(s)∗. Then c ∈ UP(s). If c ∈ s or c is valid, then c∗ ∈ s∗ or c∗ is valid, and hence
c∗ ∈ UP(s∗). Otherwise c is the unit propagation of c′, ` ∈ UP(s), and then a trivial induction on the length of the
derivation shows that then c′∗, `∗ ∈ UP(s∗) and then c∗ ∈ UP(s∗).
For the ⊇ direction suppose c∗ ∈ UP(s∗). If c∗ ∈ s∗ or c∗ is valid, then c ∈ s or c is valid, and then c ∈ UP(s) and thus
c∗ ∈ UP(s)∗. Otherwise c is the unit propagation of c′∗, `∗ ∈ UP(s∗), and then a trivial induction on the length of the
derivation shows that c′∗, `∗ ∈ UP(s)∗, and then c′, ` ∈ UP(s), and so c ∈ UP(s) and c∗ ∈ UP(s)∗.
• Now we show that (s−)∗ = (s∗)−. We have c∗ ∈ (s−)∗ iff c ∈ s− iff no other clause in s subsumes c iff no other clause in
s∗ subsumes c∗ iff c∗ ∈ (s∗)−.
• Finally we show that (s+)∗ = (s∗)+. We have c∗ ∈ (s+)∗ iff c ∈ s+ iff some clause in s subsumes c iff some clause in s∗
subsumes c∗ iff c∗ ∈ (s∗)+.
Lemma 60 Let ψ be objective, ∗ be a name involution and T (s′0) be disjoint from T (s0) ∪ T (gnd(ψ)). Then ·, s0 ∪ s′0 |≈ ψ iff·, s∗0 ∪ s′0 |≈ ψ∗.
Proof. By induction on |ψ|.
• For the base case consider a clause c. By assumption, T (c) ⊆ T (gnd(ψ)). Then ·, s0 ∪ s′0 |≈ c iff c ∈ UP+(s0 ∪ s′0) iff
(by Lemma 58) c ∈ UP+(s0) or s′0 is obviously inconsistent iff c∗ ∈ UP+(s0)∗ or s′0 is obviously inconsistent iff (by
Lemma 59) c∗ ∈ UP+(s∗0) is obviously inconsistent iff (by Lemma 58) ·, s∗0 ∪ s′0 |≈ c∗.
• The induction steps for ¬(α ∨ β), ∃xα, ¬∃xα, and ¬¬α are trivial.
Corollary 61 Let ψ be objective and ∗ be a name involution. Then |≈ ψ iff |≈ ψ∗.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 60 for s′0 = ∅.
Lemma 62 Let ψ be objective, ∗ be a name involution, and T (s′0) be disjoint from T (s0) ∪ T (gnd(ψ)). Then s0 ∪ s′0 |≈ Lkψ
iff s∗0 ∪ s′0 |≈ Lkψ∗.
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Proof. We show s0∪s′0, ·, v∪v′ |≈ Lkψ iff s∗0∪s′0, ·, v∗∪v′ |≈ Lkψ∗ where T (v′) are disjoint from T (s0)∪T (gnd(ψ))∪T (v).
The proof is by induction on k.
• For the base case consider k = 0. By Lemma 60, ·, s0∪s′0∪v∪v′ |≈ ψ iff ·, s∗0∪s′0∪v∗∪v′ |≈ ψ∗. Moreover, s0∪s′0∪v∪v′ is
obviously/potentially inconsistent iff (by Lemma 58) s0∪v or s′0∪v′ is obviously/potentially inconsistent iff (by Lemma 59)
s∗0 ∪ v∗ or s′0 ∪ v′ is obviously/potentially inconsistent. Thus s0 ∪ s′0, ·, v ∪ v′ |≈ L0ψ iff s∗0 ∪ s′0, ·, v∗ ∪ v′ |≈ L0ψ∗.
• Now consider k+ 1 and suppose s0∪ s′0, ·, v∪ v′ |≈ Kkψ iff s∗0 ∪ s′0, ·, v∗∪ v′ |≈ Kkψ∗. Then s0∪ s′0, ·, v∪ v′ |≈ Kk+1ψ
iff for some t and all n ∈ Nt, s0 ∪ s′0, ·, v ∪ v′ ∪ {t = n} |≈ Kkψ iff (by induction) for some t and all n ∈ Nt,
s∗0 ∪ s′0, ·, (v ∪ {t= n})∗ ∪ v′ |≈ Kkψ∗ or s∗0 ∪ s′0, ·, v∗ ∪ (v′ ∪ {t= n}) |≈ Kkψ∗ iff s∗0 ∪ s′0, ·, v∗ ∪ v′ |≈ Kk+1ψ∗.
• Now consider k+1 and suppose s0∪s′0, ·, v∪v′ |≈Mkψ iff s∗0∪s′0, ·, v∗∪v′ |≈Mkψ∗. Then s0∪s′0, ·, v∪v′ |≈Mk+1ψ
iff for some t and n ∈ Nt, s0∪s′0, ·, v∪{t=n}∪v′ |≈Mkψ or s0∪s′0, ·, (vunionmultis0 (t=n))∪v′ |≈Mkψ or s0∪s′0, ·, v∪(v′unionmultis′0
(t= n)) |≈Mkψ iff (by induction and Lemma 59) for some t and all n ∈ Nt, s∗0 ∪ s′0, ·, (v ∪ {t= n})∗ ∪ v′ |≈Mkψ∗ or
s∗0∪s′0, ·, v∪(v′∪{t=n}) |≈Mkψ∗ or s∗0∪s′0, ·, (v∗unionmultis∗0 (t∗=n∗))∪v′ |≈Mkψ or s∗0∪s′0, ·, v∪(v′unionmultis′0 (t=n)) |≈Mkψ
iff s∗0 ∪ s′0, ·, v∗ ∪ v′ |≈Mk+1ψ∗.
Lemma 63 Let φ be proper+, T = T or T = T (gnd(α)) ⊇ T (gnd(ψ)) for some α be a set of primitive terms, ψ be objective,
and ∗ be a name involution that leaves the names in φ unchanged. Then gnd(φ)|T |≈ Lkψ iff gnd(φ)|T |≈ Lkψ∗.
Proof. First consider T = T . Then gnd(φ)|T = UP−(gnd(φ)). Since gnd(φ) = gnd(φ)∗ and by Lemma 59, we have
UP−(gnd(φ)) = UP−(gnd(φ))∗. Thus gnd(φ)|T = gnd(φ)|∗T and the lemma follows from Lemma 62.
Now consider T = T (gnd(α)) for some α such that T (gnd(α)) ⊇ T (gnd(ψ)). Let s0 be the least set such that if c ∈
UP−(gnd(φ)) and c mentions a term from T (gnd(ψ)) or shares a term with another clause in s0, then c ∈ s0. Let s′0 be
UP−(gnd(φ)|T ) \ s0. By construction, T (s′0) is disjoint from T (s0) ∪ T (gnd(ψ)) (*). Furthermore, s∗0 is the least set such
that if c ∈ UP−(gnd(φ))∗ and c mentions a term from T (gnd(ψ))∗ or shares a term with another clause in s∗0, then c ∈ s∗0;
by Lemma 59 and since gnd(φ) = gnd(φ)∗, this is the least set such that if c ∈ UP−(gnd(φ)) and c mentions a term from
T (gnd(ψ)) or shares a term with another clause in s∗0, then c ∈ s∗0; and hence s0 = s∗0 (**). Then gnd(φ)T |≈ Lkψ iff
s0 ∪ s′0 |≈ Lkψ iff (by (*) and Lemma 62) s∗0 ∪ s′0 |≈ Lkψ∗ iff (by (**)) s0 ∪ s′0 |≈ Lkψ∗ iff gnd(φ)|T |≈ Lkψ∗.
Lemma 64 Let φ be proper+, T = T or T = T (gnd(α)) ⊇ T (gnd(ψ)) for some α be a set of primitive terms, and ψ be
objective. Then gnd(φ)|T |≈ Lkψx1...xjn1...nj iff |≈ RES[φ, T,Lkψ]x1...xjn1...nj .
Proof. By induction on j.
• For the base case, |≈ RES[φ, T,Lkψ] iff |≈ TRUE if gnd(φ)|T |≈ Lkψ and otherwise |≈ ¬TRUE iff gnd(φ)|T |≈ Lkψ.
• For the base case, suppose j > 0 and ψx1n1 satisfies the lemma for every n1 ∈ Nx1 . Consider RES[φ, T,Lkψ]
x1...xj
n1...nj .
If n1 occurs in φ or ψ, then all but one of the disjuncts in RES[φ, T,Lkψ]
x1...xj
n1...nj are false, and we have |≈
RES[φ, T,Lkψ]
x1...xj
n1...nj iff |≈ RES[φ, T,Lkψxn1 ]
x2...xj
n2...nj iff (by induction) gnd(φ)|T |≈ Lkψx1...xjn1...nj .
If n1 does not occur in φ or ψ, then all but the last disjuncts in RES[φ, T,Lkψ]
x1...xj
n1...nj are false, and the last disjunct
simplifies to |≈ RES[φ, T,Lkψx1nˆ ]nˆ x1...xjx1n1...nj . As RES[φ, T,Lkψx1nˆ ]nˆx1 mentions neither nˆ nor n1, we can apply an involution
that swaps nˆ and n1 and leaves everything else unchanged, and |≈ RES[φ, T,Lkψx1nˆ ]nˆ x1...xjx1n1...nj iff (by Corollary 61)
|≈ RES[φ, T,Lkψx1nˆ ]nˆ x1...xjx1n∗1 ...n∗j iff (since n
∗
1=nˆ) iff |≈ RES[φ, T,Lkψx1nˆ ]x2...xjn∗2 ...n∗j iff (by induction) gnd(φ)|T |≈ Lkψ
x1x2...xj
nˆ n∗2 ...n
∗
j
iff (by Lemma 63) gnd(φ)|T |≈ Lkψx1...xjn1...nj .
E.2 The ‖ · ‖ Operator
Definition 65 Let φ be proper+, T be a set of primitive terms, and α withoutO. Then ‖α‖φ,T is defined as follows:
• ‖t= t′‖φ,T is t= t′;
• ‖¬α‖φ,T is ¬‖α‖φ,T ;
• ‖(α ∨ β)‖φ,T is (‖α‖φ,T ∨ ‖β‖φ,T );
• ‖∃xα‖φ,T is ∃x‖α‖φ,T ;
• ‖Lkα‖φ,T is RES[φ, T,Lk‖α‖φ,T ];
• ‖Gα‖φ,T is ‖α‖φ,T∩T (gnd(α)).
Lemma 66 Let φ be proper+, T = T or T = T (gnd(α)) ⊇ T (gnd(σ)) for some α be a set of primitive terms, and σ be
subjective and withoutO. Then gnd(φ)|T |≈ σx1...xjn1...nj iff |≈ ‖σ‖φ,T x1...xjn1...nj .
Proof. We show gnd(φ)|T , s |≈ αx1...xjn1...nj iff ·, s |≈ ‖α‖φ,T x1...xjn1...nj by induction on |α|.
• The non-modal cases are trivial since ‖ · ‖ does not introduce any new clauses.
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• Consider Lkα. Then gnd(φ)|T |≈ Lkαx1...xjn1...nj iff (by reducing Lk ) for certain sets of split literals v, gnd(φ)|T ∪ v
is obviously/not potentially inconsistent or/and ·, gnd(φ)|T ∪ v |≈ αx1...xjn1...nj iff (by induction) for these v, gnd(φ)|T ∪
v is obviously/not potentially inconsistent or/and ·, gnd(φ)|T ∪ v |≈ ‖α‖φ,T x1...xjn1...nj iff (by reversing the steps
to reduce Lk ) gnd(φ)|T |≈ Lk‖α‖φ,T x1...xjn1...nj iff (since ‖α‖φ,T x1...xjn1...nj is objective, by Lemma 64) gnd(φ)|T |≈
RES[φ, T,Lk‖α‖φ,T ]x1...xjn1...nj iff gnd(φ)|T |≈ ‖Lkα‖φ,T x1...xjn1...nj .
• ConsiderGα. Then gnd(φ)|T |≈ Gαx1...xjn1...nj iff (gnd(φ)|T )T (gnd(α)) |≈ αx1...xjn1...nj iff gnd(φ)|T∩T (gnd(α)) |≈ αx1...xjn1...nj iff (by
induction) |≈ ‖α‖φ,T∩T (gnd(α))x1...xjn1...nj iff |= ‖Gα‖φ,T x1...xjn1...nj .
Theorem 6 (Representation theorem) Let φ be proper+, σ be subjective and withoutO. ThenOφ |≈ σ iff |≈ ‖σ‖φ,T .
Proof. Oφ |≈ σ iff (by Theorem 38) gnd(φ) |≈ σ iff (by Lemma 36) gnd(φ)|T |≈ σ iff (by Lemma 66) |≈ ‖σ‖φ,T .
F Decidability
This section proves the decidability result Theorem 4. First we show that only finitely many literals need to be considered for
bothKk andMk . Next we show that finite groundings of proper+ knowledge bases suffice. Then we put these results together to
define a decision procedure.
Definition 67 For a term t, let Vt(α) be the maximum number of free variables in any subformula of α. Then we define the
following sets of names:
• Nt•(α) = Nt(α) ∩ {n | t= n or t 6= n is a subformula of an element of gnd(α)};
• N +pt (α) = Nt(α) ∪ {n1, . . . , np ∈ Nt \ Nt(α)};
• N +pt• (α) = Nt•(α) ∪ {n1, . . . , np ∈ Nt \ Nt(α)};
• N +v+pt (α) = N +Vt(α)+pt (α);
• N +v+pt• (α) = N +Vt(α)+pt• (α).
(To make N +pt (α),N +pt• (α) well-defined, we assume np are the minimal names w.r.t. some preorder < that do not occur in
Nt(α)). Let N +p(α) =
⋃
tN +pt (α) and N +v+p(α) =
⋃
tN +v+p(α). These definitions naturally extend to sets of formulas and
terms; when the set is finite, we sometimes omit the brackets.
F.1 Finite Splitting forKk
Lemma 68 Let φ be proper+, ψ be objective, and n1 ∈ Nt \Nt•(φ, ψ, t) and n2 ∈ Nt \Nt(φ, ψ, t). Then gnd(φ), ·, {t=n1} |≈
Lkψ iff gnd(φ), ·, {t= n2} |≈ Lkψ.
Proof. Since n1 ∈ Nt \ N +0t• (φ, ψ, t), we have either n1 ∈ Nt \ Nt(φ, ψ, t) or n1 ∈ Nt(φ, ψ, t) but t= n1 and t 6= n1 are no
subformulas of gnd(φ, ψ, t).
First suppose n1 ∈ Nt \Nt(φ, ψ, t). Let ∗ be the name involution that swaps n1 and n2 and leaves all other names unchanged.
Then gnd(φ), ·, {t= n1} |≈ Lkψ iff gnd(φ)∗, ·, {t= n1}∗ |≈ Lkψ∗ iff gnd(φ), ·, {t= n2} |≈ Lkψ.
Now suppose n1 ∈ Nt(φ, ψ, t) but t=n1 and t 6=n1 are no subformulas of gnd(φ, ψ, t). First we show that if UP(gnd(φ)∪{t=
n1})\{t=n1} = UP(gnd(φ)∪{t=n2})\{t=n2}, and c ∈ (UP(gnd(φ)∪{t=n1})\{t=n1})∪(UP(gnd(φ)∪{t=n2})\{t=n1})
contains neither t= n1, t 6= n1, t= n2, nor t 6= n2 by induction on the length of the derivation of c.
• For the base case, c ∈ UP0(gnd(φ) ∪ {t = n1}) \ {t = n1} iff c is a valid literal or gnd(φ) iff c ∈ UP0(gnd(φ) ∪ {t =
n2}) \ {t= n2}. Moreover, c contains neither t= n1 nor t 6= n2. Finally suppose c contains t= n2 or t 6= n2; since neither
is valid, c ∈ gnd(φ), and since n2 ∈ Tt \ Tt(φ, ψ, t), there c must contain a literal t = x or t 6= x; then, however, c also
mentions t= n1 or t 6= n1, which contradicts the assumption. Hence c also mentions neither t= n2 nor t 6= n2.
• Now suppose c ∈ UPk+1(gnd(φ)∪{t=n1})\ (UPk(gnd(φ)∪{t=n1}). Then c is the resolution of c′, ` ∈ UPk(gnd(φ)∪
t= n1). By induction, we have four cases concerning c′, `:
– Case 1: c′, ` ∈ UPk(gnd(φ) ∪ {t = n2}) and c′, ` contain neither t = n1, t 6= n1, t = n2, nor t 6= n2. Then also
c ∈ UPk+1(gnd(φ) ∪ {t= n2}), and c contains neither t= n1, t 6= n1, t= n2, nor t 6= n2.
– Case 2: c′ ∈ UPk(gnd(φ)∪ {t= n2}) and c′ contains neither t= n1, t 6= n1, t= n2, nor t 6= n2, and ` is t= n1. Then
all literals in c′ complementary to ` are of the form t= n for n distinct from n1. By assumption, all these literals are
distinct from t= n2. Hence c is the unit propagation of c′ and t= n2, and hence c ∈ UPk+1(gnd(φ) ∪ {t= n2}) and
c contains neither t= n1, t 6= n1, t= n2, nor t 6= n2.
– Case 3: ` ∈ UPk(gnd(φ)∪ {t= n2}) and ` is neither t= n1, t 6= n1, t= n2, nor t 6= n2, and c′ is t= n1. This is just a
special case of Case 2.
– Case 4: c′, ` both are t= n1. This contradicts the assumption that c is the unit propagation of c′, `.
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• Now suppose c ∈ UPk+1(gnd(φ)∪{t=n2})\ (UPk(gnd(φ)∪{t=n2}). Then c is the resolution of c′, ` ∈ UPk(gnd(φ)∪
t= n2). By induction, we have two different cases concerning c′, `:
– Case 1: c′, ` ∈ UPk(gnd(φ) ∪ {t = n1}) and c′, ` contain neither t = n1, t 6= n1, t = n2, nor t 6= n2. Then also
c ∈ UPk+1(gnd(φ) ∪ {t= n1}), and c contains neither t= n1, t 6= n1, t= n2, nor t 6= n2.
– Case 2: c′ ∈ UPk(gnd(φ)∪ {t= n1}) and c′ contains neither t= n1, t 6= n1, t= n2, nor t 6= n2, and ` is t= n2. Then
all literals in c′ complementary to ` are of the form t= n for n distinct from n2. By assumption, all these literals are
distinct from t= n1. Hence c is the unit propagation of c′ and t= n1, and hence c ∈ UPk+1(gnd(φ) ∪ {t= n1}) and
c contains neither t= n1, t 6= n1, t= n2, nor t 6= n2.
– Case 3: ` ∈ UPk(gnd(φ)∪ {t= n1}) and ` is neither t= n1, t 6= n1, t= n2, nor t 6= n2, and c′ is t= n2. This is just a
special case of Case 2.
– Case 4: c′, ` both are t= n2. This contradicts the assumption that c is the unit propagation of c′, `.
Since no clause in UP(gnd(φ) ∪ {t= ni}) \ {t= ni} mentions t 6= ni, both gnd(φ) ∪ {t= n1} is potentially inconsistent iff
gnd(φ)∪{t=n2} is not potentially inconsistent. An induction on k and subinduction on |ψ| then shows that gnd(φ), ·, {t=n1} |≈
Lkψ iff gnd(φ), ·, {t= n2} |≈ Lkψ.
Lemma 69 Let φ be proper+ and ψ be objective. Then gnd(φ) |≈ Kk+1ψ iff for some t ∈ T , for all n ∈ Nt, gnd(φ∧ t= n) |≈
Kkψ.
Proof. We show by induction on k that gnd(φ), ·, {t= n} ∪ v |≈ Kkψ iff gnd(φ ∧ t= n), ·, v |≈ Kkψ.
• The base case follows by a simple subinduction on |ψ| since gnd(φ) ∪ {t= n} ∪ v = gnd(φ ∧ t= n) ∪ v.
• For the induction step, gnd(φ), ·, {t = n} ∪ v |≈ Kk+1ψ iff for some t′ ∈ T , for all n′ ∈ Nt′ , gnd(φ), ·, {t = n} ∪ v ∪
{t′ = n′} |≈ Kkψ iff (by induction) for some t′ ∈ T , for all n′ ∈ Nt′ , gnd(φ ∧ t = n), ·, v ∪ {t′ = n′} |≈ Kkψ iff
gnd(φ ∧ t= n), ·, v |≈ Kk+1ψ.
Since gnd(φ) |≈ Kk+1ψ iff for some t ∈ T , for all n ∈ Nt, gnd(φ), ·, ∅ ∪ {t= n} |≈ Kkψ, the lemma follows by the above
statement.
Lemma 70 Let φ be proper+, ψ be objective. Then gnd(φ) |≈ Kk+1ψ iff for some t ∈ T (gndN +v+0(φ,ψ)(φ, ψ)), for all
n ∈ N +1t• (φ, ψ, t), gnd(φ ∧ t= n) |≈ Kkψ.
Proof. First we show that gnd(φ) |≈ Kk+1ψ iff for some t ∈ T (gndN +v+0(φ,ψ)(φ, ψ)), for all n ∈ Nt, gnd(φ ∧ t= n) |≈ Kkψ.
The if direction immediately follows by the semantics. Conversely, suppose gnd(φ) |≈ Kk+1ψ. Then for some t ∈ T , for all
n ∈ Nt, gnd(φ), ·, {t=n} |≈ Kkψ. Then there is such a t with t ∈ T (gnd(φ, ψ)), for otherwise t=n cannot be complementary
to or subsume any literal occurring in gnd(φ, ψ). In particular, then t mentions at most Vn′(φ, ψ) names of the same sort as n′
that do not occur in φ or ψ. Let ∗ be a name involution that swaps these n′ ∈ N (t) \N (φ, ψ) with some n′∗ ∈ N +v+0n′ (φ, ψ) and
leaves all other names unchanged. Then t∗ ∈ T (gndN +v+0(φ,ψ)(φ, ψ)), and for every n ∈ Nt, gnd(φ), ·, {t= n} |≈ Kkψ iff for
every n ∈ Nt, gnd(φ)∗, ·, {t∗ = n∗} |≈ Kkψ iff for every n ∈ Nt, gnd(φ), ·, {t∗ = n} |≈ Kkψ iff (by Lemma 69) for every
n ∈ Nt, gnd(φ ∧ t∗ = n) |≈ Kkψ.
Next we show that gnd(φ) |≈ Kk+1ψ iff for some t ∈ T , for all n ∈ N +1t (φ, ψ, t), gnd(φ ∧ t = n) |≈ Kkψ. The only-if
direction immediately follows by the semantics. Conversely, suppose for some t ∈ T , for all n ∈ N +1t• (φ, ψ, t), gnd(φ∧ t=n) |≈
Kkψ. By Lemma 69, for all n ∈ N +1t• (φ, ψ, t), gnd(φ), ·, {t = n} |≈ Kkψ. Let {nˆ} = N +1t• (φ, ψ, t) \ Nt•(φ, ψ, t); then
nˆ ∈ Nt\Nt(φ, ψ, t) and gnd(φ), ·, {t=nˆ} |≈ Kkψ, and by Lemma 68, for all n ∈ Nt\Nt•(φ, ψ, t), gnd(φ), ·, {t=n} |≈ Kkψ.
Hence for every name n ∈ Nt, gnd(φ), ·, {t= n} |≈ Kkψ. Thus gnd(φ) |≈ Kk+1ψ.
F.2 Finite Splitting forMk
Definition 71 Let φ be proper+ and ` be a literal t=n. Let Φ be the least set such that if `, ˆ`are isomorphic and ¬ˆ` /∈ UP(gnd(φ)),
then
∨
1≤i≤j,n∈N (φ) xi = n ∨
∨
1≤i1<i2≤j xi1 = xi2 ∨ ˆ`
n1...nj
x1...xj ∈ Φ where {n1, . . . , nj} ∈ N (ˆ`) \ N (φ) and x1, . . . , xj are
variables of corresponding sort. Then φ unionmulti ` is defined as {φ} ∪ Φ.
Lemma 72 Let φ be proper+ and ` be a literal t = n. Then φ unionmulti ` is finite (modulo variable renamings) and a well-defined
formula, N (φ unionmulti `) = N (φ), and V(φ unionmulti `) ≤ max{V(φ), |t|+ 1}, where |t|+ 1 is the arity of t.
Proof. Assume the notation from the definition of φ unionmulti `. Since N (φ) is finite, every element in Φ is a well-defined formula.
Since there are only finitely many variables in `n1...njx1...xj , the set Φ must be finite as well (modulo variable renamings). Hence φunionmulti `
is a well-defined formula. Since Φ introduces no new names, N (φ unionmulti `) = N (φ), and since the clauses in Φ contain at most
|t|+ 1 variables, V(φ unionmulti `) ≤ max{V(φ), |t|+ 1}.
Lemma 73 Let φ be proper+ and ` be a literal t= n. Then UP−(gnd((φ unionmulti `) \ {φ})) = ∅ unionmultignd(φ) `.
Proof. First we show the⊆ direction. By construction, every clause in UP(gnd((φunionmulti`)\{φ})) is either a unit clause or subsumed
by a unit clause. Hence UP−(gnd((φunionmulti `) \ {φ})) only contains literals ˜`of the form (ˆ`n1...njx1...xj )x1...xjn′1...n′j , where ˆ` is isomorphic to `,
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¬ˆ` /∈ UP(gnd(φ)), {n1, . . . , nj} = N (ˆ`) \ N (φ), n′i /∈ N (φ), and n′i1 6= n′i2 for i1 6= i2. Let ∗ be the involution that swaps n′i
and ni. Then ˆ` is identical to ˜`∗, so ˆ`, ˜`are isomorphic. Moreover, ¬ˆ` /∈ UP(gnd(φ)), so ¬˜` /∈ UP(gnd(φ))∗, and by Lemma 59,
¬˜` /∈ UP(gnd(φ)). Hence, ˜`∈ ∅ unionmultignd(φ) `.
For the ⊇ direction suppose ˆ`∈ ∅ unionmultignd(φ) `. Then `, ˆ`are isomorphic and ¬ˆ` /∈ UP+(gnd(φ)). Then
∨
1≤i≤j,n∈N (φ) xi =
n ∨ ∨1≤i1<i2≤j xi1 = xi2 ∨ ˆ`n1...njx1...xj ∈ (φ unionmulti `) \ {φ} where {n1, . . . , nj} ∈ N (ˆ`) \ N (φ) and x1, . . . , xj are variables of
corresponding sort, and hence ˆ`∈ UP(gnd((φ unionmulti `) \ {φ})).
Lemma 74 Let φ be proper+. Then UP+(gnd(φ unionmulti (t= n))) = UP+(gnd(φ) ∪ (∅ unionmultignd(φ) (t= n))).
Proof. By Lemma 73, UP+(gnd(φ)∪(∅unionmultignd(φ)`)) = UP+(gnd(φ)∪UP−(gnd((φunionmulti`)\{φ}))), and by Lemma 33, UP+(gnd(φ)∪
UP−(gnd((φ unionmulti `) \ {φ}))) = UP+(gnd(φ) ∪ gnd((φ unionmulti `) \ {φ})) = UP+(gnd(φ unionmulti `)).
Lemma 75 Let φ be proper+ andψ be objective. Then gnd(φ) |≈Mk+1ψ iff for some t ∈ T and n ∈ Nt, gnd(φ∧t=n) |≈Mkψ
or gnd(φ unionmulti (t= n)) |≈Mkψ.
Proof. Precisely analogous to the proof of Lemma 69, we gnd(φ), ·, {t = n} ∪ v |≈ Mkψ iff gnd(φ ∧ t = n), ·, v |≈ Mkψ.
Additionally, we show by induction on k that gnd(φ), ·, (∅ unionmultignd(φ) (t= n)) ∪ v |≈Mkψ iff gnd(φ unionmulti (t= n)), ·, v |≈Mkψ.
• The base case follows by a simple subinduction on |ψ| sinceUP+(gnd(φ)∪(∅unionmultignd(φ)(t=n))∪v) = UP+(gnd(φunionmulti(t=n))∪v)
by Lemmas 33 and 74.
• For the induction step, gnd(φ), ·, (∅ unionmultignd(φ) (t= n))∪ v |≈Mk+1ψ iff for some t′ ∈ T and n′ ∈ Nt′ , gnd(φ), ·, (∅ unionmultignd(φ)
(t=n))∪v∪{t′=n′} |≈Mkψ or gnd(φ), ·, ((∅unionmultignd(φ)(t=n))∪v)unionmultignd(φ)(t′=n′) |≈Mkψ iff (by induction and definition
of unionmultignd(φ)) for some t′ ∈ T and n′ ∈ Nt′ , gnd(φunionmulti(t=n)), ·, v∪{t′=n′} |≈Mkψ or gnd(φ), ·, vunionmultignd(φ)(t′=n′) |≈Mkψ
iff gnd(φ unionmulti (t= n), ·, v |≈Mk+1ψ.
Since gnd(φ) |≈Mk+1ψ iff for some t ∈ T and n ∈ Nt, gnd(φ), ·, ∅∪{t=n} |≈Mkψ or gnd(φ), ·, ∅unionmultignd(φ) (t=n) |≈Mkψ,
the lemma follows by the above statement.
Lemma 76 Let φ be proper+, ψ be objective. Then gnd(φ) |≈ Mk+1ψ iff for some t ∈ T (gndN +v+0(φ,ψ)(φ, ψ)) and some
n ∈ N +1t• (φ, ψ, t), gnd(φ ∧ t= n) |≈Mkψ or gnd(φ unionmulti (t= n)) |≈Mkψ.
Proof. The if direction immediately follows from the definition of the semantics. For the converse direction, suppose gnd(φ) |≈
Mk+1ψ. Then for some t ∈ T and n ∈ Nt, gnd(φ), ·, {t= n} |≈Mkψ or gnd(φ), ·, ∅ unionmultignd(φ) (t= n) |≈Mkψ. Then there is
such a t with t ∈ T (gnd(φ, ψ)) and n ∈ N (gnd(φ, ψ)), for otherwise t= n cannot be complementary to or subsume any literal
occurring in gnd(φ, ψ). In particular, then t mentions at most Vn′(φ, ψ) names of the same sort as n′ that do not occur in φ or ψ.
Let ∗ be a name involution that swaps these n′ ∈ N (t) \ N (φ, ψ) with some n′∗ ∈ N +v+0n′ (φ, ψ) and swaps n in case it is not inN (t) with the nameN +1t∗•(φ, ψ, t∗)\Nt∗•(φ, ψ, t∗) and leaves all other names unchanged. Then t∗ ∈ T (gndN +v+0(φ,ψ)(φ, ψ)) and
n∗ ∈ N +1t∗•(φ, ψ, t∗), and gnd(φ), ·, {t=n} |≈Mkψ or gnd(φ), ·, ∅unionmultignd(φ) (t=n) |≈Mkψ iff gnd(φ)∗, ·, {t∗=n∗} |≈Mkψ∗
or gnd(φ)∗, ·, ∅ unionmultignd(φ)∗ (t∗ = n∗) |≈Mkψ∗ iff gnd(φ), ·, {t∗ = n∗} |≈Mkψ or gnd(φ), ·, ∅ unionmultignd(φ) (t∗ = n∗) |≈Mkψ iff (by
Lemma 75) gnd(φ ∧ t∗ = n∗) |≈Mkψ or gnd(φ unionmulti t∗ = n∗) |≈Mkψ.
F.3 Finite Setup
Lemma 77 Let φ be proper+, α be some formula, and c be a clause. Suppose |Nt(c) \ Nt(φ, α)| ≤ Vt(φ) for every term t. Let
∗ be an involution that swaps every n ∈ N (c) \ N (φ, α) with a name n∗ ∈ N +v+1n (φ, α) \ Nn(φ, α) and leaves all names inN (φ, α) unchanged. Then c ∈ UP(gnd(φ)) implies c∗ ∈ UP(gndN +v+1(φ,α)(φ)).
Proof. We show by induction on k that when c ∈ UPk(gnd(φ))− and ∗ is a bijection that swaps every n ∈ N (c) \ N (φ, α) with
an n∗ ∈ N +v+1n (φ, α) \ Nn(φ, α) and leaves the rest unchanged, then c∗ ∈ UPk(gndN +v+1(φ,α)(φ)).
• First consider the base case k = 0. If c is a valid literal, then c∗ is a valid literal as well, and hence c∗ ∈
UP(gndN +v+1(φ,α)(φ)). Otherwise, c ∈ gnd(φ), so c = (ci)x1...xjn1...nj for some ci and n1, . . . , nj . Then c∗ = (ci)x1...xjn∗1 ...n∗j ,
and hence c∗ ∈ UP(gndN +v+1(φ,α)(φ)).
• Now suppose the claim holds for k and suppose c ∈ UPk+1(gnd(φ))− and ∗ is a bijection that swaps every n ∈ N (c) \
N (φ, α) with an n∗ ∈ N +v+1n (φ, α) \ Nn(φ, α) and leaves the rest unchanged. Now suppose c is the unit propagation of
c′, ` ∈ UP(gnd(φ)). By Lemmas 10 and 17, either c′ or ` must not be valid; without loss of generality suppose that c′ is not
valid. We have the following cases:
1. ` is of the form t 6= n1 and c′ contains t= n1, or alternatively ` is of the form t= n1 and c′ contains t 6= n1. Let ◦ be
the involution such that n◦ is n∗ for every n ∈ N (c) \N (φ, α) and that furthermore swaps every n ∈ N (`) \N (φ, α)
with n◦ ∈ N +v+1n (φ, α) \ Nn(φ, α) and leaves the rest unchanged. Such an involution exists because Nt(c′) ⊇ Nt(`)
and |Nt(c′) \Nt(φ, α)| ≤ |N +v+1t (φ, α) \Nt(φ, α)|. Then ◦ is an involution that swaps all n ∈ N (c′) \N (φ, α) with
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n◦ ∈ N +v+1n (φ, α) \ Nn(φ, α). By induction, c′◦, `◦ ∈ UPk(gndN +v+1(φ,α)(φ)). Since c∗ is the unit propagation of c′◦
and `◦, we have c∗ ∈ UPk+1(gndN +v+1(φ,α)(φ)).
2. ` is of the form t = n1 and c′ contains at least one literal of the form t = n2. Let ◦ be the involution such that n◦
is n∗ for every n ∈ N (c) \ N (φ, α) and that furthermore swaps every n ∈ (N (`) ∪ N (c′)) \ (N (c) ∪ N (φ, α))
with n◦ ∈ N +v+1n (φ, α) \ Nn(φ, α) and leaves the rest unchanged. Such an involution exists because Nt(c′) ⊇
(Nt(`) \ {n1}) and |(Nt(c′) ∪ {n1}) \ Nt(φ, α)| ≤ |N +v+1t (φ, α) \ Nn(φ, α)|. Then ◦ is an involution that swaps all
n ∈ (N (c′) ∪N (`)) \ N (φ, α) with n◦ ∈ N +v+1n (φ, α) \ Nn(φ, α). By induction, c′◦, `◦ ∈ UPk(gndN +v+1(φ,α)(φ)).
Since c∗ is the unit propagation of c′◦ and `◦, we have c∗ ∈ UPk+1(gndN +v+1(φ,α)(φ)).
F.4 Decision Procedure
Definition 78 Let φ be proper+ and ψ be objective. Let φ|T be the conjunction of clauses of the form
∨
1≤i≤j,n/∈N +(φ,ψ) xi =
n ∨ ∨i1 6=i2 xi1 = xi2 ∨ cn1...njx1...nj for every c ∈ gndN +v+1(φ,ψ)(φ)|T where x1, . . . , xj are of the same sorts as {n1, . . . , nj} =
N +v+1(φ, ψ) \ N (φ, ψ), and where the empty clause is turned into a clause x 6= x.
Lemma 79 Let φ be proper+, ψ be objective. Let N ⊇ N +v+1(φ, ψ). Then UP−(gndN (φ|T )) = gndN (φ)|T .
Proof. For the ⊆ direction suppose c′ ∈ UP−(gndN (φ|T )). Then c′ is the result of unit propagation with the grounding of a
formula
∨
1≤i≤j,n/∈N +(φ,ψ) xi=n∨
∨
i1 6=i2 xi1 =xi2∨c
n1...nj
x1...nj with names n′1, . . . , n
′
j . Then n
′
i ∈ N \N (φ, ψ) and n′i1 6= n′i2 , for
otherwise the clause were subsumed by the valid literal n′i1 =n
′
i2
and hence not in UP−(gndN (φ|T )). Thus c′ is just cn1...njn′1...n′j ; for if
c′ were the result unit propagation of cn1...njn′1...n′j , then c
′ would subsume cn1...njn′1...n′j , and by Lemma 77, c
′n′1...n′j
n1...nj ∈ UP(gndN (φ)) and
c /∈ UP−(gndN (φ)) and hence also c /∈ gndN (φ)|T , which contradicts the assumption. Then by Lemma 77 c′ ∈ UP−(gndN (φ)),
and an induction on the construction of gndN (φ)|T shows that c′ ∈ gndN (φ)|T .
Conversely, suppose c ∈ gndN (φ)|T . Then φ|T contains a clause c′ of the form
∨
1≤i≤j,n/∈N +(φ,ψ) xi = n ∨
∨
i1 6=i2 xi1 =
xi2 ∨ cn1...njx1...nj . Then c′x1...xjn1...nj ∈ UP(gndN +v+1(φ,ψ)(φ|T )), and by unit propagation with valid literal clauses, c ∈
UP(gndN +v+1(φ,ψ)(φ|T )). Then c is not subsumed by any other in UP(gndN +v+1(φ,ψ)(φ|T )), for otherwise c /∈ gndN (φ)|T ⊆
UP−(gndN (φ)). Thus c ∈ UP−(gndN +v+1(φ,ψ)(φ|T )).
Lemma 80 Let φ be proper+ and ψ be objective and withoutG. Then gnd(φ)|T |≈ Lkψ iff gnd(φ|T ) |≈ Lkψ iff the following
reduction is true:
1. gnd(φ|T ) |≈ ` iff ` is valid or subsumed by some c ∈ UP(gndN +v+1(φ|T ,`)(φ|T ))
2. gnd(φ|T ) |≈ (ψ ∨ χ) iff
• (ψ ∨ χ) is valid or subsumed by some c ∈ UP(gndN +v+1(φ|T ,ψ,χ)(φ|T )) if (ψ ∨ χ) is a clause;
• gnd(φ|T ) |≈ ψ or gnd(φ|T ) |≈ χ otherwise;
3. gnd(φ|T ) |≈ ¬(ψ ∨ χ) iff gnd(φ|T ) |≈ ¬ψ and gnd(φ|T ) |≈ ¬χ;
4. gnd(φ|T ) |≈ ∃xψ iff gnd(φ|T ) |≈ ψxn for some n ∈ N +1x (φ|T , ψ);
5. gnd(φ|T ) |≈ ¬∃xψ iff gnd(φ|T ) |≈ ¬ψxn for every n ∈ N +1x (φ|T , ψ);
6. gnd(φ|T ) |≈ ¬¬ψ iff gnd(φ|T ) |≈ ψ;
7. gnd(φ|T ) |≈ K0ψ iff
• gndN +v+1(φ|T )(φ|T ) is obviously inconsistent, or
• gnd(φ|T ) |≈ ψ;
8. gnd(φ|T ) |≈ Kk+1ψ iff
for some t ∈ T (gndN +v+0(φ|T ,ψ)(φ|T , ψ)) and every n ∈ N +1t• (φ|T , ψ, t),
gnd(φ|T ∧ t= n) |≈ Kkψ;
9. gnd(φ|T ) |≈ ¬Kkψ iff gnd(φ|T ) 6|≈ Kkψ;
10. gnd(φ|T ) |≈M0ψ iff
• gndN +v+1(φ|T )(φ|T ) is not potentially inconsistent, and
• gnd(φ|T ) |≈ ψ;
11. gnd(φ|T ) |≈Mk+1ψ iff
for some t ∈ T (gndN +v+0(φ|T ,ψ)(φ|T , ψ)) and n ∈ N +1t• (φ|T , ψ, t),
gnd(φ|T ∧ t= n) |≈Mkψ or
gnd(φ|T unionmulti (t= n)) |≈Mkψ;
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12. gnd(φ|T ) |≈ ¬Mkψ iff gnd(φ|T ) 6|≈Mkψ.
Proof. The step from gnd(φ)|T to gnd(φ|T ) holds by Lemmas 79 and 36. Rules 1 and 2 follow from Lemma 77. Rule 3 is trivial.
Rules 4 and 5 follow from Lemma 63. Rule 6 is trivial. Rule 7 follows from Lemma 77. Rule 8 follows from Lemma 70. Rule 9
is trivial. Rule 10 follows from Lemma 77. Rule 11 follows from Lemma 76. Rule 12 is trivial.
Theorem 4 (Decidability) Let φ be proper+ and σ be objective. Then gnd(φ) |≈ σ is decidable.
Proof. Follows directly from Theorem 6 and Lemma 80.
F.5 Complexity
This section proves the complexity results Theorem 5 and Corollary 7.
Theorem 5 (Tractability) Let φ, ψ be propositional, φ be proper+, ψ be objective. ThenOφ |≈ Lkψ is decidable in O(2k(|φ|+
|ψ|)k+2).
Proof. First consider Oφ |≈ Kkψ. Let f(k) be the complexity of deciding this with the procedure from Lemma 80 after
k splits. Then f(0) ∈ O((|φ| + k) · |ψ|), as at most k literals have been added to φ and unit propagation and the at most
|ψ| subsumptions can be computed in linear time. Furthermore, f(k + 1) ∈ O((|φ| + |ψ|) · f(k)) as only primitive terms
and their corresponding right-hand side plus one more name need to be tested for splitting; there are at most 13 · (|φ| + |ψ|)
primitive terms in φ and ψ. Then f(k) ∈ O((|φ|+ |ψ|)k · (|φ|+ k) · |ψ|) = O((|φ|+ |ψ|)k · (|φ|+ |φ|+ |ψ|) · (|φ|+ |ψ|)) =
O((|φ|+ |ψ|)k · 2 · (|φ|+ |ψ|) · (|φ|+ |ψ|)) = O((|φ|+ |ψ|)k+2).
Now consider Oφ |≈ Mkψ. Let f(k) be the complexity of deciding this with the procedure from Lemma 80 after k
splits. Then f(0) ∈ O(2 · (|φ| + |ψ|) · |ψ|), as at most |φ| + |ψ| literals have been added during splitting. Furthermore,
f(k + 1) ∈ O(2 · (|φ|+ |ψ|) · f(k)) as only terms in φ and ψ are split with their corresponding right-hand side plus one more
name, and both the one-literal and the isomorphic-literals variants need to be checked; there are at most 13 · (|φ|+ |ψ|) primitive
terms in φ and ψ. Then f(k) ∈ O(2k ·(|φ|+|ψ|)k ·2·(|φ|+|ψ|)·|ψ|) = O(2k ·(|φ|+|ψ|)k+1 ·|ψ|) = O(2k ·(|φ|+|ψ|)k+2).
Corollary 7 (Tractability) Let φ, σ be propositional, φ be proper+, σ be subjective, and k ≥ l for every Kl ,Ml in σ. Then
Oφ |≈ σ is decidable in O(2k(|φ|+ |σ|)k+3).
Proof. σ contains at most |σ| subformulas Llσ′, each of which by Theorem 6 reduces to at most |σ| instances of solving
Oφ |≈ Llψ where |ψ| ≤ |σ′| ≤ |σ|. By Theorem 5, each instance can be solved in O(2k(|φ|+ |σ|)k+2).
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